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B.Sc., BANGLADESH UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sandip Kundu
Although low-power and Internet-connected gadgets and sensors are increasingly inte-
grated into our lives, the optimal design of these systems remains an issue. In particular, 
authentication, privacy, security, and performance are critical success factors. Furthermore, 
with emerging research areas such as autonomous cars, advanced manufacturing, smart 
cities, and building, usage of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is expected to skyrocket [61]. 
A single compromised node can be turned into a malicious one that brings down whole 
systems or causes disasters in safety-critical applications. This dissertation addresses the 
critical problems of (i) device management, (ii) data management, and (iii) service man-
agement in IoT systems. In particular, we propose an integrated platform solution for IoT 
device authentication, data privacy, and service security via blockchain-based smart con-
tracts. We ensure IoT device authentication by blockchain-based IC traceability system, 
from its fabrication to its end-of-life, allowing both the supplier and a potential customer to 
verify an IC’s provenance. Results show that our proposed consortium blockchain framework 
implementation in Hyperledger Fabric for IC traceability achieves a throughput of 35 trans-
actions per second (tps). To corroborate the blockchain information, we authenticate the IC 
securely and uniquely with an embedded Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). For reli-
vi
able Weak PUF-based authentication, our proposed accelerated aging technique reduces the
cumulative burn-in cost by ∼ 56%. We also propose a blockchain-based solution to integrate
the privacy of data generated from the IoT devices by giving users control of their privacy.
The smart contract controlled trust-base ensures that the users have private access to their
IoT devices and data. We then propose a remote configuration of IC features via smart
contracts, where an IC can be programmed repeatedly and securely. This programmability
will enable users to upgrade IC features or rent upgraded IC features for a fixed period after
users have purchased the IC. We tailor the hardware to meet the blockchain performance.
Our on-die hardware module design enforces the hardware configuration’s secure execution
and uses only 2,844 slices in the Xilinx Zedboard Zynq Evaluation board. The blockchain
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The increasing availability of computing and communication infrastructure has allowed
electronic devices surrounding us to be interconnected to work smartly, collectively called
the Internet of Things (IoT). The intelligent, interconnected IoT devices bring significant
and indispensable convenience and intelligence in every aspect of our lives. However, IoT is
still confronting several challenges and manifesting a series of issues that we need to address
urgently. Counterfeit hardware, data privacy, software faults, system management difficul-
ties, security issues during communication, and remote device service management are vital
issues for current IoT infrastructure. Although several works have proposed new standards,
lightweight protocols, and novel frameworks, some IoT challenges remain unresolved.
To address the challenges of implementing IoT infrastructure, a holistic new approach
and technical solution are necessary. The inherently distributed nature of IoT necessitates
the design of distributed solutions and novel architecture models. In this dissertation, we
propose that the blockchain technology can address some of the weaknesses mentioned above.
In particular, we propose an integrated platform solution for IoT device authentication, data
privacy, and service security via blockchain. This chapter first explains a few backgrounds
and the motivation behind the work. Derived from this motivation, we present the scope of
the work. Finally, we give an overview of the structure of this dissertation.
1.1 Blockchain
Blockchains are distributed ledgers that maintain a continuously growing list of ordered
records called blocks [157]. A distributed ledger is a type of shared database, replicated, and
synchronized among the members of a decentralized network. Each block contains a list of
transactions, timestamp, nonce, and a link to the previous block, forming a chronological
chain. A transaction is a transfer of any asset with a value from the current owner to a new
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owner. To submit transactions to the blockchain, each node uses a pair of private and public
keys. First, the node constructs and signs a transaction and broadcasts it to the blockchain
network. Each blockchain node validates any transactions it receives before broadcasting
them to its peers, dropping invalid transactions. The miner nodes in the network construct
a new block to record these valid transactions and broadcast it to their peers, who verify
it before appending it to the ledger. This process repeats continuously. To resolve different
states, or “forks” in the network, each blockchain employs a mechanism, known as consensus
[206]. Figure 2.2 illustrates a blockchain formed from a sequence of blocks, each containing
multiple transactions.
Often introduced as the technology behind Bitcoin [157, 191], blockchain has potential
applications in numerous industries beyond financial services [123,202]: from real estate [156,
204] and health-care [122] to utilities [37,131], the government sector [215], and IoT [72,100].
These applications have been possible because of its decentralized nature. Applications that
could previously run only through a trusted intermediary can now operate without a central
authority and achieve the same functionality. The distributed ledger facilitates business
networks wherever anything of value needs to be tracked and traded without requiring
central management.
1.1.1 Blockchain Classification
There are three types of blockchain: public, private, and consortium. Public blockchains
are accessible to every Internet user. The public nature stems from the fact that everyone in
the blockchain network can freely and unconditionally participate in the consensus process.
A private blockchain is a blockchain where write permissions are kept centralized to one
organization [54].
In a consortium blockchain, a pre-selected group of organizations control the consensus
process instead of allowing any user within a blockchain network to participate in the con-
sensus process or allowing a single organization to have full control. The right to read the
blockchain can be made public or restricted to the consortium blockchain participants. A




Smart contracts are blockchain-powered autonomous computer programs that, once
started, execute automatically the conditions defined beforehand, such as the verification,
facilitation, or enforcement of the negotiation or performance of a contract [203]. Smart
contracts give us distributed trustworthy computations on a blockchain platform. They
translate the existing contractual clauses into embedded hardware and software so that it
can self-verify that conditions have been met to execute the contract [55]. Smart contracts
contain code functions and interact with other contracts, make decisions, store data, and
send tokens/money to others.
The main benefit of deploying smart contracts in a blockchain is the blockchain’s as-
surance that the contract terms cannot be modified. The blockchain makes it extremely
expensive to modify or tamper the contract terms. It generates the confidence and security
necessary to automate the declarative phrases without resorting to a third party.
1.1.3 Security of Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Despite the widespread adoption of blockchain-based solutions, the blockchain systems
encounter several security threats. The two most fundamental attacks against blockchain
systems are the double-spend attack [164] and the selfish mining attack [48]. In a double-
spend scenario, an attacker creates a transaction that moves funds to a merchant’s address.
After the transaction appears in the newest block on the main branch, the attacker takes
possession of the purchased goods. The attacker then releases two blocks immediately,
using his mining power, with a transaction in the first that transfers the funds to a second
attacker-owned address. In this way, the attacker can have the goods and his coin back.
In a selfish mining attack, the selfish miner keeps discovered blocks secret and continues
to mine on top of them, hoping to gain a larger lead on the public chain, and only publishes
the selfish chain to claim the rewards when the public chain approaches the length of the
selfish chain. Though risking some secret blocks’ rewards, once the selfish chain is longer than
its competitor, the selfish miner can securely invalidate honest miners’ competing blocks.
Accordingly, the overall expectation of the selfish miner’s relative revenue increases.
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Apart from the double-spend attack and the selfish mining attack, some of the well-known
attacks on blockchains include the eclipse attack [48], private key leakage, vulnerabilities in
smart contracts [35]. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature to counter these
threats that increase the security, efficiency, and transparency of blockchain systems [47,163]
and ensure smart contracts’ security [46] and privacy [127,225].
1.2 PUFs
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) harness the intrinsic disorder in an IC introduced
during the fabrication process and provide a set of unique input to output mappings, called
challenge-response pairs (CRPs) [65, 200]. Based on the implementation, a PUF that pro-
vides a limited set of CRPs is classified as a Weak PUF, while a design that can produce an
exponential number of CRPs is called a Strong PUF.
1.2.1 Strong PUFs
Strong PUFs can be leveraged for an authentication mechanism to uniquely identify an
IC and detect tampering, impersonation, or substitution of such components. The salient
features of a Strong PUF are the uniqueness of responses across different PUFs to the
same challenge, ensuring the reliability of a response in the presence of noise, and the
unclonability in the form of being resistant to model-building attacks [183]. Even if a Strong
PUF exhibits ideal uniqueness and unclonability [212], it can still be susceptible to noise.
Hence, authentication using a Strong PUF requires acquiring multiple CRPs to check against
a database and applying a threshold to account for noise. The number of CRPs required
depends on the total population of possible devices that need to be distinguished and the
noise that may affect the system [175].
1.2.2 Weak PUFs
Weak PUFs can be leveraged for secure cryptographic key generation to combat semi-
conductor device counterfeiting, theft of service, and tampering. Weak PUFs rely on intrinsic
process variations to produce repeatable and unique fingerprints. This fingerprint is further
processed to generate a unique cryptographic key. For generating a reliable key, the fin-
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gerprint needs to be reproducible over time, even under changing environmental conditions.
However, noise in the system can affect the fingerprint and introduce errors. To alleviate
noise and generate stable keys, literature works have proposed several solutions, such as
error-correcting codes [64], accelerated device aging [112,113], built-in self-test [43], etc.
1.3 Scope of this Work
The Internet of Things, refers to the billions of physical devices worldwide connected to
the Internet, all collecting and sharing data. Centralized approaches to building an Internet
of hundreds of billions of things are expensive, do not scale, lack privacy, pose security
challenges to large-scale enterprises, and are not designed for business model endurance
[111]. The use of blockchain as a reliable, distributed ledger of transactions and peer-to-
peer communication among participating nodes can offer greater scalability and security for
the IoT. It can offer multidimensional reinforcements for the IoT infrastructure. In this
work, we propose blockchain-based solutions for building smart mechanisms in IoT systems
contributing to device management, data management, and service management.
We propose a blockchain-based IC traceability system for IoT device authentication.
Our proposed traceability system allows both the supplier and a potential customer to ver-
ify an IC’s provenance, from its fabrication to its end-of-life. To corroborate the blockchain
information, we authenticate the IC securely and uniquely by embedded Physically Unclon-
able Function (PUF). We propose a method to enhance the reliability of Weak PUFs via
post-Silicon accelerated aging.
IoT devices send out sensitive information that must be protected from unauthorized
access, usage, or disclosure. We propose a blockchain-based protocol that integrates the
privacy of data generated from the IoT devices by giving users control of their privacy. In
an exemplary solution, we show how smart contracts can facilitate efficient IoT devices by
automating their operations and decision making in sharing economies. This autonomous
decision-making capabilities of blockchain-enabled IoT devices can eliminate privacy threats.
When using blockchain, the user’s private key is regarded as the identity and security cre-
dential. However, users often rely on third-party hosted nodes to access the wallet and check
balances, initiate transactions, and more. Such reliance can be exploited by a side-channel
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attack to extract the private key successfully. We propose a method where a co-tenant
thread monitors the power management side-channel information from a thread affected by
a hardware Trojan. Such a Trojan can leak private keys and disrupt digital transactions.
Blockchain and smart contracts provide transparency, longevity, and allow applications
to minimize the need for a trusted arbiter. Facilitation of these three aspects can enable
remote, secure device service management. This work proposes a protocol for remote config-
uration of IC features, where a user can program an IC repeatedly and securely using smart
contracts. Our proposed integrated platform solution facilitates proof of data integrity, de-
vice authentication, and secure features reconfiguration. A fundamental primitive to achieve
this goal is establishing a trust-base that cannot be tampered with. Storing data by using
blockchain secured with PUF derived keys provides an assurance that data has not been
tampered with, in addition to providing traceability and transparent auditing capabilities.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses existing IC
authentication methods and presents a method of IC authentication via blockchain pegged
to embedded PUFs. In Chapter 3, we propose a methodology to eliminate privacy threats
from IoT-enabled telematics devices via blockchain-based smart contracts. In Chapter 4,
we present a technique to improve the reliability of PUFs by accelerated aging. In Chapter
5, we propose a hardware Trojan that can leak private keys using a power management side
channel and a software solution to suppress the side channel. In Chapter 6, we propose a
remote configuration of IC features via smart contracts. We conclude the dissertation in
Chapter 7 with insights for future work.
1.5 Collaborators
All five studies were conducted under the supervision of Professor Sandip Kundu. The
study featured in Chapter 2 was a collaboration with Vinay Patil. Chapter 3 was done in
collaboration with Arman Pouraghily and Professor Tilman Wolf. The study featured in
Chapter 4 was done in collaboration with Professor Daniel Holcomb and Vinay Patil.
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CHAPTER 2
ENABLING IC TRACEABILITY VIA BLOCKCHAIN PEGGED TO
EMBEDDED PUF
2.1 Introduction
The globalization of semiconductor manufacturing has increased the risk of tampered and
counterfeit products from manufacturing to distribution and field use. Malicious actors can
counterfeit, tamper with, or re-package ICs, and introduce compromised ICs into the supply
chain [90, 103]. This compromised supply chain exacts financial loss to legitimate suppliers
[168] and poses a security risk for safety-critical applications, like defense [30,99,104]. In the
effort to stem the tide of counterfeit electronics, traceability has long been established and
promoted [154]. Traceability plays a crucial role in securing the supply chain by counterfeit
electronic parts avoidance, detection, mitigation, and disposition. Hence, it is necessary to
develop a secure IC traceability system that can allow both the supplier and a potential
customer to verify its provenance.
Traceability refers to the combination of the ability to know the current possession of
a product at all times (track) and the ability to find the origin, ownership history, time
spent at each point (trace), by means of recorded identifications [114,117]. Tracing allows a
customer to establish a product’s provenance with a high degree of confidence. Tracking can
help suppliers minimize counterfeit products and offer value-added services, like a product
recall, during the life-cycle of a product.
Prior works proposed implementing a centralized system with a governing third party
to empower supply chain traceability to ensure data and transaction transparency over a
product’s lifetime. The governing third party is commissioned to create a centralized data
storage to enable a flow of trusted information [94, 159]. However, relying on a governing
third party to broker all data about every product’s supply chain may create a single point
of weakness and inherent bias, fraud in the system. If the party were the brand itself, or the
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most powerful actor in the supply chain, it would ultimately be responsible for only its bot-
tom line; this could lead to selective disclosure or, worse, extortion. If a third party gathered
the supply chain data, it would have to be totally unbiased and adequately incentivized to
deliver the system’s technical capability.
However, third parties like NGOs or industry associations would become a single point of
weakness; this would make them and their operations a vulnerable target for bribery, social
engineering, or targeted hacking. For example, GS1 is a standards organization trying to
solve supply chain problems by uniquely identifying and accurately capturing information
about products. However, according to recent Data Quality pilots, data accuracy was a
growing problem — about 50% of the data surveyed was inaccurate [7]. Besides, GS1 has,
of late, been restricting access to the centralized product database, excluding consumers and
prioritizing corporations [24]. Moreover, although few supply chains are integrated, their
supporting information systems can be heavily fragmented [158]. Hence, there is a need to
come up with a more robust approach for developing IC traceability. Potential solutions
must also account for legitimate re-sale of devices during the product lifetime.
In this chapter, we propose novel IC traceability protocols via a blockchain-based owner-
ship management system. Blockchains can enable the IC ownership transfer information to
be verified, recorded and make it infeasible for any malicious party to alter or challenge the
legitimacy of the information recorded. Thus, this verifiable and shared ledger can enable an
IC’s identification and traceability throughout the supply chain and its deployment lifetime.
However, including just the ownership and simple IC information in the blockchain is
not sufficient enough. To corroborate a record in the blockchain against a physical device,
the device must be authenticated securely and uniquely. For this purpose, we utilize phys-
ical unclonable functions (PUFs) as the hardware root-of-trust. We propose securely and
uniquely identifying an IC using both Strong and Weak PUFs to corroborate the blockchain
information in this work. This work’s primary focus is specifically on securing the IC supply
chain, although we can apply the methodology to any electronic device supply chain. The
major contributions of this work are:
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• Proposing a blockchain-based open traceability protocol that IC suppliers can use to
track and detect any counterfeits in supply chain.
• Enhancing the traceability protocol, such that, customers can trace and verify IC’s
provenance.
• Proposing a smart contract which automates self-execution of the enrollment, authen-
tication, and ownership transfer of an IC.
• Developing a comprehensive ownership management system which enables each party
along the supply chain to prove the ownership of PUF-embedded IC and transfer it to
a new owner.
• Demonstrating the proposed solution in Ethereum blockchain. The code has been
made publicly accessible in Github [2].
We outline this chapter as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related works on trace-
ability solutions for counterfeit detection in the IC supply chain. After that, we describe
our motivation behind a blockchain-based solution for IC traceability in Section 2.3. In the
following two sections, we propose two novel IC traceability protocols via blockchain pegged
to embedded PUFs. The first protocol is based on customized blockchain transactions (Sec-
tion 2.4), while the second protocol is based on smart contracts (Section 2.5). Section 2.6
presents a detailed analysis of the proposed protocols regarding security, privacy, reliability,
performance, and scalability. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the proposed protocols
in 2.7 and conclude the chapter in Section 2.8.
2.2 Related Works
Several traceability solutions have been proposed in the literature for counterfeit detec-
tion in the IC supply chain. These solutions resort to RFIDs, various kinds of chip IDs,
package IDs, blockchain, etc. In this section, we present the literature works which proposed
various IC traceability solutions.
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2.2.1 RFID-based Traceability
RFID-based counterfeit detection has been proposed in [75, 190, 197, 223]. Schuster et
al. proposed an RFID-based track and trace solution using EPC (Electronic Product Code)
Network infrastructure [126]. Staake et al. proposed an extension of EPC Network in-
frastructure with an EPC Product Authentication Service to provide secure authentication
functionalities [197]. Shi et al. proposed a Batch Clone Detection (BCD) scheme, which
performs the clone tag detection at a batch level [190]. The proposed scheme reduces stor-
age and computational overhead on the centralized detection server side. Elkhiyaoui et al.
proposed a new protocol, CHECKER, for counterfeit detection in RFID-based supply chains
through on-site checking [75]. In this protocol, RFID readers can verify product genuine-
ness by checking the product’s path’s validity, while RFID-equipped products travel through
the supply chain. However, RFID-based technologies cannot provide truly secure solutions
for supply chain traceability because an adversary can easily copy one RFID tag’s unique
identifier to another tag.
2.2.2 Package ID-based Traceability
Several traceability solutions proposed affixing a unique ID in package (SHIELD [62]),
on the package (DNA marking [154], nanorods [128], QR codes) of each component to track
it as it moves throughout the supply chain. For verifying the trustworthiness of an electronic
component, DARPA initiated a program called SHIELD (Supply Chain Hardware Integrity
for Electronics Defense) [62]. The program proposes to embed a dielet into host packages
of legitimately produced ICs, without disrupting or harming the system. A secure remote
server stores the information for identification and authentication, such as cryptographic
key and serial ID for each dielet. Passive sensors inside the dielet can record any malicious
behavior as tampering evidence. Jin et al. proposed an improved protocol that resists the
try-and-check attack in DARPA’s example authentication protocol [118]. The proposed two-
phase activation secures the untrusted transit between a trusted fabrication facility and an
assembly facility. A true random number generator (TRNG) inside the dielets efficiently
generates their cryptographic keys and serial IDs in parallel during a trusted fabrication
process.
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2.2.3 Chip ID-based Traceability
Several works have proposed traceability solutions using various kinds of chip IDs, such
as PUFs or ECIDs [179]. Skudlarek et al. proposed a hardware root-of-trust based solution
that enables connection of SoCs to a secure server [193] for tracking them at each step in
the supply chain. An SRAM PUF provides each chip with its unique ID and DNA. The chip
connects to a secure server at important stages in the supply chain. The server authenticates
the chip and records that event, establishing a reliable audit trail for the chip’s progress and
providing proof of provenance. Several Strong PUF-based RFID ICs have also been proposed
previously for supply chain traceability [65,176,208]. In these methods, the back-end server
stores a list of challenge-response pairs for RFID tags with embedded PUF. When the RFID
tag communicates with a reader, the back-end server sends a challenge and the tag’s PUF
reconstructs, and transmits the corresponding response. If the response matches the one
stored by the back-end server, the tag is verified. In all these methods, RFID monitoring
schemes need to have either a persistent online connection between supply chain partners
and the back-end database or a local database on each partner site to perform authentication
appropriately. However, this approach is not secure from a man-in-the-middle attack. ECID-
based chip tracking solutions [179,222] are not secure. As it is static and readable, it is easy
to clone an ECID. Moreover, the chip vendors are silos. Individual companies do not share
data across corporate boundaries and cannot build cross-party trust relationships.
2.2.4 Blockchain-based Traceability
Blockchains have been successfully deployed to enable the supply chain integrity of vari-
ous commodities. For example, Walmart has proposed monitoring the food supply chain by
tracking the temperature variations and the time taken to transit food commodities [185].
However, it is not straightforward to apply it to the electronics supply chain as the semi-
conductor industry has some unique characteristics compared to other industries. It would
not be a secure solution to enable electronic products’ authentication and integrity only by
the shipping time and packaging appearance.
In literature [89], the authors proposed a method to protect the information flow in IoT
devices with blockchain. The proposed solution uses blockchain for storage, transparency,
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auditability of the IoT data. The proposed solution explores its benefits to multi-factor
authentication, software integrity, and continuous authentication of IoT devices. However,
it does not facilitate traceability solutions and ownership management to ensure the integrity
of the supply chain, from fabrication to the end of product-life, that can allow a customer
to verify the provenance of a device or a system. Hence, a more comprehensive protocol is
required to enable IC traceability, authenticate a device, and transfer the ownership for a
secure supply chain.
2.3 Motivation
This work’s key novelty is developing a blockchain-based traceability protocol for ensur-
ing that the IC supply chain can be fully tracked and traced from the time of fabrication to
the end of product-life. Several works have been done to deploy blockchain across a wide
span of industries: from finance [123] and health-care [122] to utilities [131], real estate [156],
government sector [215], and IoT [72, 100]. To the best of our knowledge, no other works
have used blockchain for IC traceability and supply chain integrity. In the next section, we
describe why we need a blockchain instead of a centralized database for IC traceability.
2.3.1 Transparency and End-to-end Visibility with Blockchain
For secure IC authentication, it is required that (i) data transparency and trust is
preserved, (ii) there is end-to-end traceability of ICs produced from an untrusted supply
chain (originated from diverse suppliers who might be dispersed throughout the globe), and
(iii) the chip identity is bound to the device. A blockchain-based traceability solution can
increase transparency, add end-to-end visibility, maintain a single version of the truth about
the supply chain, and provide cyber-attack resilience for data storage via no single point of
failure. Blockchain establishes a trusted environment for all participants — manufacturers,
distributors, retailers, and consumers, who can gain permissioned access to known and
trusted information regarding their transactions’ origin and state.
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2.3.2 Blockchain vs Private Databases for IC Traceability
If IoT device authentication data is kept into private databases by the designers (e.g.,
the scenario that each vendor maintains the authentication data of hardware components),
various security and trust issues may arise. Firstly, these databases are maintained and
updated by a database administrator (DBA). If a competitor can bribe the DBA, they can
compromise the database. Secondly, the vendor performs authentication within a private
network that is not interoperable with any other network. Thirdly, a system integrator may
use a large number of different chips from different manufacturers. It would be inconvenient
to validate the authenticity of all chips from various companies.
2.3.3 Blockchain vs Centralized Database for IC Traceability
If IoT device authentication data is kept in a centralized database, it is vulnerable to
being modified by malicious insiders without being noticed. The corruption of the adminis-
trator will violate the trust and integrity of the whole network. As a result, to record the
authentication data of ICs and build a secure and trustworthy authentication infrastructure,
a database accessible to all the supply chain participants should be maintained. In this work,
we explore an alternative solution to perform IoT authentication using blockchain.
We focus on the supply chain integrity from a different angle — an end-to-end framework
to provide a comprehensive solution from the device fabrication stage to systems’ end-of-life.
Blockchain ensures the management of all necessary information in a trusted and decentral-
ized manner. This decentralization enables all supply chain participants to track, verify, and
authenticate devices. Time-stamped tracking information provides tamper-resistance and
evidence. Blockchain also creates opportunities for more supply chain participants within
the vertical to join the network.
2.4 Proposed IC Traceability Protocol based on Customized Blockchain
Transactions
In this section, we present our proposed protocol for IC traceability via customized
blockchain transactions [110]. First, we describe our approach and the key system require-
ments of the protocol. After that, we present the methodology of creating our customized
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transaction in the blockchain for IC traceability. Finally, we explore ownership transfer
details, which is the key part of our overall blockchain protocol.
2.4.1 Approach
The blockchain will contain a record of the relevant IC ownership transfer information,
termed as a transaction, and PUF data, used for authentication, for each point of transfer
over the device’s lifetime. This record also enables proof of ownership without an explicit
need for a trusted intermediary. Furthermore, authorized parties can utilize the blockchain
to authenticate, track, analyze, and provision chips.
Before detailing the protocol, we specify the key requirements for creating the blockchain
and explain their necessity for enabling reliable tracing of ICs.
1. Only the legitimate IC manufacturers registered with a designated consortium can
claim the initial ownership and write the relevant PUF data on the blockchain.
2. Only the IC’s current owner can create a new transaction for transferring the ownership
to a new owner.
The first requirement prevents unauthorized parties, like counterfeiters, from falsely
claiming ownership of an IC. This requirement can be ensured by verifying that the first
transaction in the blockchain for ownership transfer (the genesis transaction) was created
only by the registered IC manufacturer. We propose consortium blockchain for the verifi-
cation in our protocol. The consortium can be formed of multiple semiconductor organiza-
tions, each of which operates a node in the blockchain. Examples of such organizations can
be Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
(JEDEC), etc. Validation of a transaction requires a set number of nodes to sign-off on it.
The second requirement prevents an unauthorized party from hijacking an IC’s owner-
ship by creating a fraudulent transaction. Our protocol grants only the current owner the
ability to create a new transaction. The information in the last transaction recorded in
the blockchain establishes the current owner’s identity, and PUF authentication verifies the
owner’s physical possession of the IC.
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2.4.2 Transaction and Blockchain Creation
We leverage Bitcoin’s idea [157], in which the possession of a user’s balance can be
proven in the blockchain. In particular, by borrowing the ideas presented in the "proof of
possession of balance" used in Bitcoin, we introduce here the concept of "proof of possession
of IC". In this section, we describe how our protocol customizes the blockchain transaction
and transfers the ownership in a step by step process.
2.4.2.1 Ownership addresses and keys
All the potential owners of an IC are assigned their addresses, used during ownership
transfer. Owners generate their addresses from ECDSA (Elliptical Curve Digital Signing
Algorithm) public/private key pair. First, a random 256-bit private key is generated. Each
transaction is supplemented with a digital signature created using the private key. The
signature uniquely identifies the current owner as of the seller.
Kpriv ∈ {0, 1}256
Next, a 512-bit public key is generated from the private key using the ECDSA algorithm.
The public key is used for verification of the transaction signature. The public key is not
revealed until a transaction is signed, unlike most systems where the public key is made
public.
Kpub = ECDSA512(Kpriv)
Since the 512-bit public key is large, it is converted to a smaller address shared with
others and utilized as a part of the blockchain transaction. The 512-bit public key is hashed
using SHA-256, further hashed using RIPEMD-160 to generate the 160-bit address.
Kaddress = RIPEMD160(SHA256((Kpub)))
The consortium plays a key role in authenticating participants, and it maintains a direc-
tory that binds the identity information of an associated party with a transaction address.
Any blockchain-based identity management system can ensure the reliability of the user’s
entity information [36,139,178].
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Table 2.1: Transaction format for ownership transfer. The Size is for a single IC ownership
transfer.
Field Description Size (Bytes)
Input(s)
icCount Number of ICs variable
serialNumber Identifier of an IC variable
prevTxID The previous transaction reference 32
icInfo Other necessary information related to IC variable
challenges Challenge to the PUF variable
hashResponse Hash of the Responses from PUF variable
signature Seller’s signature 71
publicKey Seller’s public key for verifying the signature 64
Output(s)
value Transaction Value 1
publicKeyHash Buyer’s Address 20
2.4.2.2 Transaction customization
The general structure of a transaction in our protocol is shown in Table 2.1. We denote
the current and the new owners as the seller and buyer, respectively. A transaction input
contains the reference to the previous transaction, seller’s signature, seller’s public address,
and IC information. A transaction output contains the buyer’s address and transaction
value. The salient features of a transaction are described as follows:
• Our proposed protocol facilitates the seller to sell multiple ICs in the same transaction.
The seller needs to specify the number of ICs to be sold in the icCount field.
• The serialNumber in the format serves as an identifier for an IC. This identifier (e.g.,
Electronic Product Code, or EPC) can be used to enable the verifier to look up the
correct transaction for the IC being queried among a collection of ICs. Here, the serial
number is being used to identify, and not as the primary means to authenticate. For
each IC, the corresponding previous transaction hash is referenced in the prevTxID
field. For a genesis transaction, this is set to none. Other important IC information
is included in the icInfo field.
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• Each IC’s PUF challenge-response data is included in challenge and hashResponse
field, respectively. For achieving reliable authentication on-field, the manufacturer
includes the most stable CRPs in the transaction. The manufacturer can also generate
helper data for error correction and achieving greater reliability. Literature works have
shown that the helper data can be constructed to become known to an adversary
without compromising the PUF response’s secrecy, i.e., it does not need to be kept
secret [69, 182]. The manufacturer can include it in the transaction during device
enrollment or at the device side in insecure one-time programmable (OTP) non-volatile
memory (NVM).
• A transaction includes the seller’s signature and the public key in signature and
publicKey field, respectively. The seller generates the public key from the private key.
The hash of this public key must match the hash given in the previous transaction
output (publicKeyHash). The public key is also used to verify the seller’s signature.
The signature is an ECDSA signature over a hash of a raw version of the transaction.
The signature, combined with the public key, proves that the real owner created the
transaction.
• The transaction output nominates the buyer’s address in publicKeyHash field. Any
future transaction by the buyer will require the relevant public key and signature.
2.4.2.3 Incorporating a transaction to a block and creating a blockchain
After signing a transaction, the seller sends it into the consortium blockchain network,
where the nodes pick up the transaction and verify the signature cryptographically. After
verification, the blockchain node ensures that the referenced transaction has not been spent
in a different transaction to prevent double spending. Finally, all the verified transactions
that are considered to have happened at the same time are placed in groups called blocks.
Table 2.2 presents the structure of a block.
Each block has a reference to the previous block, and this is what places one block after
another, forming a chronological chain. A consensus mechanism ensures that the creation
and modification of data are agreed upon by all the nodes or a majority of the nodes. Each
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prevBlockHash The hash value of the previousblock used as a pointer 32
Header timeStamp A Unix timestamp recording when
this block was created
4
nonce
The block-specific nonce to allow





txnCount Number of transactions in block 1
transaction List of verified transactions variable
transaction in a block is tied to a unique identifier (TxID), a double SHA256 hash of the
verified, signed transaction. A TxID is used to look up a transaction in the blockchain and
reference for future transactions.
2.4.3 Protocol for Ownership Transfer
Figure 2.1 illustrates the detailed system model of the proposed ownership transfer pro-
tocol. The protocol consists of several phases, which we describe as follows:
Sending previous Transaction ID to the buyer To allow the buyer to trace the IC
supply chain information and authenticate it, the seller sends him the previous transaction
ID (TxID) in the blockchain. The latest transaction information of an IC contains the
current owner’s address (publicKeyHash). Using the previous transaction ID, the potential
buyer can prove the genuineness of the seller.
IC Verification by the buyer With the received transaction ID (TxID), the buyer
can query the blockchain’s previous transaction information. The buyer can verify the
genuineness of the ownership and authenticate the IC from the blockchain information. The
occurs in the following two steps:
a) Verifying the ownership information: The buyer can verify the genuineness of the
current seller from the referenced previous transaction. Also, using TxID, the buyer can
obtain the transaction information which has reference to its previous transaction, which
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Figure 2.1: Detailed diagram of the ownership transfer protocol. *For the manufacturer,
this transaction will be the genesis transaction.
again has reference to its previous information, and so on. In this way, the buyer can trace
back along the supply chain to the IC’s provenance.
b) Authenticating the IC: The buyer can retrieve challenges from the blockchain and
apply them to the IC. The PUF embedded in the IC will give the corresponding responses.
If the calculated hash of the responses matches the hash recorded in the blockchain, the
IC is authenticated. The authenticator can be an API (blockchain accessor) or a complete
program, which a user needs to run during the verification. For online/remote sales, the
buyer/seller can designate a trusted agent/broker.
Making payment Once the IC is authenticated, and the seller’s IC ownership is
verified, the buyer makes a payment to the seller. The buyer can make the payment in
blockchain-based cryptocurrency.
Creating a transaction After receiving the payment confirmation, the seller is now
ready to issue the ownership transfer transaction. In a similar way described in section
2.4.2.2, the seller creates a transaction. Seller puts the buyer’s address in the output field
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of the transaction. If the transaction is validated and added to the blockchain, the buyer
gets the IC ownership.
2.4.4 Protocol Demonstration and Discussion
We implemented the proposed protocol in Bitcoin Testnet3 [1] and made the code avail-
able online [2]. We send the ownership information and the challenge-response pairs (CRPs)
in the Metadata field of the Testnet3 transaction. In our emulated blockchain, a genesis
transaction can be created by only selected private-public keys. Any other private-public key
pairs can create other transactions. Any transaction created with a valid private-public key
pair (whose corresponding address is the recipient of the referenced previous transaction) is
verified and incorporated into a block.
The number of PUF challenges required to distinguish 1 trillion ICs is ∼1024 for a
Hamming distance threshold of 10% [175]. For practical implementation, using, e.g., a 64-
bit arbiter PUF [200], we take the set of challenges, and apply SHA-1 hash function to the
corresponding responses. SHA-1 produces a hash digest of 160 bits. The helper data is also
added to this CRPs for error correction and achieving greater reliability. Hiller et al. showed
that the required helper data size for 165 PUF bits with the probability of 10−5 is 36 bits
[96]. This PUF data adds a total of 260 bits (64-bit challenge, plus the 160-bit hash of the
responses, and 36-bit helper data).
2.5 Proposed IC Traceability Protocol based on Smart Contracts
Our previous protocol proposed a blockchain solution for IC traceability, where we used
customized transactions for logging supply chain information. We can enhance the proposed
solution to facilitate transaction automation in an already existing blockchain platform. For
automated execution of enrollment, authentication, ownership traceability, and ownership
transfer of an IC, we propose a novel IC traceability protocol based on smart contracts
[107]. The main advantage of deploying smart contracts in a blockchain is the blockchain’s
assurance that the contract terms cannot be modified. In our proposed smart contract, the
contractual clauses regarding enrollment, authentication, and ownership transfer of an IC
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Figure 2.2: Proposed approach for IC traceability from manufacturer to the end-user. OEM:
Original Equipment Manufacturer.
are translated into embedded hardware and software. The embedded hardware and software
can self-verify that conditions have been met to execute the contract.
In this section, we present our proposed protocol for IC traceability via smart contracts.
First, we introduce the system requirements and implemented smart contracts for our pro-
posed protocol. Next, we present our proposed methodology to establish IC supply chain
traceability using blockchain and embedded PUF. After that, we detail the authentication
method used in our traceability protocol and discuss how the proposed protocol performs
counterfeit avoidance and detection. Finally, we outline a demonstration of the protocol and
discuss the practicality, limitations, and future directions.
2.5.1 System Requirements and Smart Contract Implementation
The key system requirements for IC traceability remains the same as described in Section
2.4.1. Both of the system requirements for IC traceability can be fulfilled by implement-
ing a smart contract in the blockchain. Figure 2.2 presents our proposed approach for IC
traceability using smart contracts. In our proposed protocol, a smart contract defines the
condition for enrolling a new device by a manufacturer and transferring a device to a buyer
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Figure 2.3: Smart contract implementation for IC traceability.
by the current owner. It also defines the function for checking the ownership and authenti-
cating the device. In this section, we describe all the elements needed for implementing a
smart contract.
2.5.1.1 Ownership Keys and Addresses
All the supply chain participants are registered with consortium blockchain and have
their own private-public key pairs and addresses. This unique private-public key pairs and
addresses are necessary for uniquely identifying a supply chain participant and preventing
any forgery. The method for generating private-public keys and addresses is described in
section 2.4.2.1. A user can manage personal keys and addresses using a digital wallet that
can be used to perform any transaction. A digital wallet is a software and hardware, or
specifically designed hardware, that holds the private-public keys and the address [79].
2.5.1.2 Smart Contract Implementation by the Consortium
To enable IC traceability, we have implemented smart contract, namely Ownership Con-
tract (OC). The contract is created by the consortium to maintain uniform applicability and
usability for all supply chain participants. After creating the smart contract, it is sent to
the blockchain network as a transaction that assigns an address to the contract. After this
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ALGORITHM 1: Pseudo-code of registerDevice() for registering a device claimed by a
manufacturer.
Inputs: Manufacturer’s address (addrManufacturer), and device information (deviceInfo)
if Message sender is in manufacturer’s list then
Specify owner of the device as addrManufacturer




ALGORITHM 2: Pseudo-code of checkOwnership() for verifying the ownership information
of a device.
Inputs : Seller’s public key (sellerPubKey), and device identifier (deviceIdentifier)
Output: A boolean True or False





initial transaction, the contract becomes a part of the blockchain forever, and its address
never changes. Figure 2.3 presents our proposed smart contract for IC traceability. The
smart contract, OC, provides the services for device registration, ownership information
verification, device authentication, and ownership transfer. Next, we explain these services
and how our proposed smart contract implements these.
Device Registration: For introducing a device into the supply chain, the device
must be registered first. We implement this registration by the smart contract function
registerDevice(). Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of function registerDevice().
The function enrolls a device if the message sender is one of the manufacturers registered
with the consortium. The deviceInfo in the function includes data for identification and au-
thentication. The identification data can be a serial number for the device (e.g., Electronic
Product code, or EPC). It is used to look up the targeted device being queried among a
collection of devices. Here, the device identifier is being used to identify, and not as the
primary means to authenticate. For the authentication purpose, the manufacturer includes
PUF data as input to the function registerDevice().
Ownership Verification: Before buying a device, a potential buyer needs to verify the
ownership to confirm that the owner is a genuine one. We implement this verification by
the smart contract function checkOwnership(). Algorithm 2 presents the pseudo-code of
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ALGORITHM 3: authenticateDevice() for authenticating a device.
Inputs : Identifier of the device to be transferred (deviceIdentifier)
Output: A boolean True or False
set deviceChallenge = blockchain[deviceIdentifier].Challenge
get deviceResponse from the device after applying deviceChallenge





ALGORITHM 4: transferOwnership() for transferring the ownership of a device from seller
to buyer.
Inputs: Buyer’s address (addrBuyer), and device identifier (deviceIdentifier)
if (addrMessageSender == blockchain[identifierDevice].owner) then




function checkOwnership(). This function verifies the ownership of the device against the
seller’s address. If the device with the provided identifier is owned by the seller, it returns
True. Any potential buyer invokes this function when he/she wants to verify the ownership
of the device. Additionally, the function can return the ownership history to the provenance.
Device Authentication: In our protocol, a potential buyer must authenticate a de-
vice before buying to confirm that it is authentic, not a counterfeit one. We implement
this authentication capability by the smart contract function authenticateDevice(). Al-
gorithm 3 presents the pseudo-code of authenticateDevice(). This function starts the
device authentication process for a given device identifier. The process includes getting the
challenge-response data for a particular deviceIdentifier, applying the challenge to the device
via the verifier’s wallet, calculates the response, and matching the challenge-response pairs.
Ownership Transfer: For transferring the ownership of a device, the smart contract
implements the function transferOwnership(). Algorithm 4 presents the pseudo-code of
transferOwnership(). This function transfers the device (deviceIdentifier) from the seller
(addrSeller) to the buyer (addrBuyer). First, the function checks whether the message
sender is the owner of the device with deviceIdentifier. If that is true, then the function
assigns the addrBuyer as the new owner of the device.
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2.5.2 Proposed IC Traceability Protocol
In this section, we present the details of the algorithmic procedures necessary to realize
the proposed protocol. We outline the procedure for enrolling a device by the manufacturer,
followed by the procedure for transferring the ownership, which is the key part of our overall
traceability protocol.
2.5.2.1 Enrollment of a Device by the Manufacturer
When a manufacturer (M) wants to register/enroll a device, it sends a transaction
registerDevice() to the smart contract OC (Figure 2.3). The manufacturer also sends
necessary device information, such as the device’s identifier, authentication information
(PUF data) in the transaction. We name the first transaction for the enrollment of a de-
vice as genesis transaction. The manufacturer can also enroll N number of devices in the
same transaction by including all the devices’ corresponding information. This process fa-
cilitates the scalability of the protocol. As the transactor digitally signs all the blockchain
transactions, any counterfeiter cannot illegally claim to be a non-authorized manufacturer.
2.5.2.2 Procedure for Ownership Transfer
Figure 2.4 illustrates the detailed system model of the proposed ownership transfer
protocol. In this work, we denote the current and the new owners as the seller and buyer,
respectively. The protocol consists of several phases described as follows.
Verifying the ownership information: To verify the current ownership information,
the buyer invokes checkOwnership() with the device identifier. If the return is True, the
buyer can verify the genuineness of the current seller. Additionally, the buyer can also trace
back all the way along supply chain to IC’s provenance.
Authenticating the IC: Verifying the ownership of a device is not sufficient enough.
A malicious seller can replace the original device with a counterfeit one and sell it to the
buyer. Therefore, the buyer also needs to authenticate the device with the stored blockchain
information. We propose two implementations for authentication of the device. We present
the details of the implementation in section 2.5.3.
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Figure 2.4: Detailed diagram of the ownership transfer protocol. Transactions requiring
payment of fees are drawn with solid black lines.
Making payment: Once the IC is authenticated, and the seller’s IC ownership is
verified, the buyer makes a payment to the seller. The buyer can make the payment in
blockchain-based cryptocurrency. However, details of secure payment are out of our focus
in this work.
Issuing transaction for ownership transfer: In the last step of the proposed proto-
col, the seller issues a transaction transferOwnership() with the device identifier and the
buyer’s address. This function transfers the device from the seller to the buyer.
2.5.3 Authentication by Strong and Weak PUFs
During ownership transfer, the buyer needs to authenticate an IC with the stored
blockchain information. The authenticator can be an API (smart contract front end or
blockchain accessor) or a complete program, which a user needs to run during the verifica-
tion. We propose the following two implementations for authenticating the device.
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2.5.3.1 Authentication via Strong PUFs
When a manufacturer registers a device, it sends a transaction registerDevice() to
the smart contract OC. This transaction includes necessary device information, such as
the device’s identifier and Strong PUF CRPs for future authentication. At any point in
the supply chain over the device’s lifetime, a potential buyer can authenticate a device
by invoking autheticateDevice() with the respective deviceIdentifier. This invocation
retrieves challenges from the blockchain and applies the challenges to the IC. The PUF
embedded in the IC will give the corresponding responses. If the calculated hash of the
responses matches the hash recorded in the blockchain, the IC is authenticated. Hash is a
compact representation of the entire digital content, which is easy to compute and verify.
For example, while pushing software updates, software vendors supply a hash (also known
as digest), which is digitally signed by the software vendor. This property allows the devices
to verify the software update’s authenticity by computing hash and verifying it using the
vendor’s public key. Inspired by this software attestation technique, we propose compressing
the CRP table as a digest, which can similarly attest to the authenticity of PUF CRPs
supplied by the manufacturer.
To achieve pervasive authentication, it is necessary that the authentication functionality
be easily integrated with modern electronic devices, such as smartphones, and be easy to
use. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, one such example shows an IC verification process using
Near Field Communication (NFC). Several PUF NFC tags are already used in commercial
products [224]. For an easy authentication process, a silicon PUF can be integrated into
a form of NFC. With the recent emergence of NFC-enabled smartphones, custom wired
authentication system setup is no longer necessary for many use cases. This authentication
system facilitates anyone in the supply chain to authenticate ICs using a smartphone with the
necessary application. Other possible authentication procedures can also be implemented
based on the needs of the system.
Here, we note that if the distributors and retailers have no authenticating infrastructure,
they can still look up the blockchain using device identifiers and verify the chips’ provenance.
However, in this case, they cannot authenticate the chips. An end customer can always verify
the provenance and authenticate a chip.
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Figure 2.5: Hardware authentication module for generating cryptographic key from PUF
embedded in an SoC [91].
2.5.3.2 Authentication via Weak PUFs
Several Weak PUF based public-key cryptography for authentication have been pro-
posed in the literature [32, 43, 88, 136]. Figure 2.5 presents a hardware authentication
module to generate a cryptographic key from SRAM-based Weak PUF [91]. A manufac-
turer first records the device’s Weak PUF data in the blockchain by issuing a transaction
registerDevice(). At any stage of the supply chain, any buyer can authenticate the de-
vice by invoking authenticateDevice(). We describe the components of the authentication
module and their functions as follows.
Key Generation Module: During the enrollment phase, the key generator in the
authentication module generates a private-public key pair. Using the private key, a device
can create the signature of a message protecting the message’s integrity and proving its
authenticity. The recipient can verify the digital signature for authenticity using the public
key corresponding to the private key. The private-public key pair may be keys for RSA, DSA,
Schnorr, El Gamal, Elliptic Curve based public-key cryptosystems, etc. For the illustration
purpose, we describe RSA public-key cryptography here. First, the key generator finds two
prime numbers from a seed derived from PUF output, e.g., the contents of an SRAM. Finding
prime numbers can be done on an appropriately programmed device or Hardware Security
Module (HSM). Once two prime numbers of appropriate sizes are found, an RSA private-
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Figure 2.6: (a) Device enrollment and (b) authentication process via Weak PUFs.
public key pair is constructed. The RSA key pair generation is a computationally-intensive
process and done only during the enrollment phase.
Encryption Module: The private key is encrypted with a second key (encrypting key)
generated from the same PUF and stored in a non-volatile memory. This encryption is done
using a symmetric encryption algorithm, like AES, and the encrypting key is obtained from
any random 128-bit string from the PUF. The manufacturer records the public key in the
blockchain by issuing a transaction registerDevice() for the device (Figure 2.6(a)).
Decryption Module: During the authentication phase, the encrypting key can be
generated instantly from the PUF output. Using the encrypting key, the decryption module
generates the private key of the device. When a potential buyer wants to authenticate the
device, he invokes authenticateDevice() with the device identifier. The smart contract
sends the device’s public key to the buyer’s wallet. The buyer’s wallet then sends a challenge
message generated with a pseudo-random number generator to the device. The device’s
further cryptographic module creates the device signature using the private key. Using the
public key, the buyer’s wallet can verify the digital signature for the device’s authenticity,
as shown in Figure 2.6(b).
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2.5.4 Counterfeit Detection by the Proposed Traceability Protocol
Various methods of counterfeiting ICs have been described in the literature [90]. In this
section, we present how our proposed traceability protocol prevents various counterfeiting
techniques.
2.5.4.1 Recycled & Remarked ICs
Recycled and remarked components jointly contribute more than 80% of counterfeit inci-
dents [124]. The recycled ICs are taken from used printed circuit boards (PCBs), repackaged
and remarked, and then sold in the market as new. Our proposed protocol defeats this ma-
licious approach in the following two ways:
If an unregistered, malicious manufacturer wants to introduce a recycled/remarked IC
as a legitimate new product, he will need to create a valid genesis transaction for the IC.
However, such a transaction can only be created by the original IP owner registered with
the consortium and easily monitored. The false genesis transaction would immediately be
flagged and would incriminate the counterfeiter. Also, the prevention of double spending
[164] ensures that the counterfeiter cannot introduce multiple forged ICs by pretending to
be a legitimate buyer and then attempting a future sale.
If a registered manufacturer wants to introduce a recycled/remarked IC as a legitimate
product, it must include the device identifier information in the transaction. However, an
already registered IC in the blockchain with the same device identifier would prevent the
recycled IC to re-enter into the supply chain as a new one.
2.5.4.2 Overproduced ICs
In overproduction, an untrusted foundry, assembly, or test site with access to a de-
signer’s IP, may overproduce the original IP design outside the contract and the IP’s owner
knowledge. They can then sell the overproduced ICs in the open market as the original
owner. Our proposed protocol defeats this malicious approach by requiring that the regis-
tering manufacturer sign the transaction, registerDevice() using its private key. As the
counterfeit manufacturer cannot get the original manufacturer’s key, it cannot register the
overproduced ICs as the original manufacturer.
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Figure 2.7: Chip activation using active metering [181] before enrollment of authentica-
tion data in blockchain. Green arrow indicates secure link established by the designer and
manufacturer’s public key infrastructure. ATE: Automated Test Equipment.
If the counterfeiter decides to use his brand (and own private key), there is still a need to
protect the original designer’s Intellectual Property. In this case, IC metering [31], obfusca-
tion/locking [181], and/or Secure Split Test (SST) [173] based methods can complement our
proposed approach. These approaches use an activation key to activate each chip uniquely.
Figure 2.7 shows how these approaches can complement our proposed scheme. After the
manufacturer fabricates a chip, the designer sends the chip activation key via a secure link
established by the designer and manufacturer’s public-key infrastructure (step 1 in Figure
2.7). After the chip gets the activation key, it is unlocked for testing and enrollment of PUF
authentication data (step 2). Finally, the designer sends a transaction registerDevice()
to the smart contract OC by signing the chip authentication data with its private key (step
3). Recently, logic-locking techniques have been targeted by SAT attacks [221]. These SAT
attacks against logic-locking techniques present a case for a better solution.
2.5.4.3 Cloned ICs and Tampered ICs
The current owner cannot clone an IC with the same ID and provenance information
due to the embedded PUF whose data is recorded in the blockchain. Each PUF device
has a unique and unpredictable way of mapping challenges to responses, even if it was
manufactured with the same process as a similar device, and it is infeasible to clone a PUF
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Table 2.3: Operation cost for a chip in supply chain.
Operation Gas limit Gas price Cost (in ETH) Cost (in USD)
registerDevice() 121478 10.89 ×10−9 0.0013229 0.463
transferOwnership() 30365 10.89 ×10−9 0.00033067 0.116
with the same Challenge-Response behavior as another given PUF. Sufficient PUF data is
assumed to be available in the blockchain to assure the authenticity of the IC. Furthermore,
our proposed method makes the tampering with the IC very costly due to the embedded
PUF. Various PUF tampering techniques, such as Focused Ion Beam (FIB), are costly and
would have to be performed on a per chip basis to obtain multiple clones [181].
2.5.5 Protocol Demonstration in Ethereum Blockchain
We implemented the proposed smart contract in Solidity programming language, de-
ployed it in Ethereum blockchain, and evaluated it in terms of its operational cost. We made
the code publicly accessible in Github [2]. In particular, we estimated the total cost by mea-
suring the total gas amount (execution fee for every operation made on Ethereum) for all
of the functions involved in the process, that is, (i) registering device (registerDevice()),
and (ii) transferring ownership (transferOwnership()), and then converting it into USD.
As the amount of gas is fixed for each operation in Ethereum, e.g., a SHA3 calculation costs
20 gas, the total gas amount for executing a function is also fixed. In particular, we have
used the Ethereum’s test environment tool, testrpc [115], to measure the gas amount since
it can automatically count the gas amount. With the current value of 1 ETH = 350USD
and 1 Gas = 10.89 × 10−9 ETH (10.89 Gwei), the operation cost for a chip in the supply
chain is calculated in Table 2.3. Finally, the total cost of maintaining the identity of a chip
in a supply chain with N entities is:
total cost = cost of enrollment + (N − 1)× cost of ownership transfer
Using the formula, the total cost of maintaining a chip’s identity in the supply chain
presented in Figure 2.2 with five entities (manufacturer, distributor, retailer, consumer 1,
consumer 2) is 0.463USD + 0.116×4 = 0.927USD.
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Figure 2.8: Hyperledger Fabric network model for our proposed protocol.
2.5.6 Protocol Demonstration in Hyperledger Fabric
To implement our proposed consortium blockchain and prove the proposed protocol’s ap-
plicability, we select the Hyperledger Fabric framework [33]. Hyperledger Fabric, introduced
and maintained by IBM, is becoming one of the most prominent blockchain platforms. Its
permissioned architecture and non-resource intensive consensus algorithm ideally match the
requirements of implementing our proposed blockchain. A customer could also be registered
with an identity in the blockchain. In this way, the blockchain can record the post-sale
traces as well.
2.5.6.1 Blockchain Network Model
Figure 2.8 presents the Hyperledger blockchain network model, where the manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers are the major members of the blockchain. They are registered
as nodes in the blockchain. Each node creates and maintains an identity (i.e., account,
address, or participant identity) in the system. Any addition (new member) or replacement
of identities must be notified and accepted by all the major members identified in the chain.
2.5.6.2 Implementation of the Chaincode and Access Control Policies
The chaincode (smart contract) implements the underlying functionalities that provide
data storage and management. All the blockchain’s major members verify the creation,
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maintenance, and deprecation of the chaincode. In our traceability protocol, the required
chaincode functions are described in 2.5.1.2. For regulated and secure chaincode functionali-
ties in the blockchain system, we need access control policies in our prototype infrastructure.
The blockchain system enforces the policies to give access to the operations; otherwise, it de-
nies the operations. The registerDevice() function implements the organization identity-
based access control to enforce that only a manufacturer can register a new device. The
transferOwnership() function implements the user identity-based access control to enforce
that only the owner can transfer a device’s ownership.
2.5.6.3 Performance Evaluation
We set up an experimental environment with a single machine equipped with 8-core,
3.6Ghz CPU and 16GB RAM. As depicted in Figure 2.8, we created a Hyperledger Fabric
1.4.4 network with four organizations (one manufacturer, two distributors, one retailer) in a
single channel with CouchDB state databases using docker containers [13]. We set the block
size to 80 and batch timeout to 400ms. Our endorsement policy adopts the default ‘N of
N’ policy, meaning that a transaction needs to be endorsed by all four organizations. Since
Hyperledger Fabric adopted the Raft ordering service as the new consensus mechanism,
we deployed 3 RAFT orderers on the machine. Finally, we created one client to send the
transactions.
We used Hyperledger Caliper as the blockchain performance benchmark framework [12].
We continuously send transactions from the client and observe the network’s throughput
Figure 2.9: Hyperledger Caliper benchmark result.
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Figure 2.10: Throughput and latency of the registerDevice() transaction in the proposed
blockchain implementation using Hyperledger Fabric.
and latency. Figure 2.9 presents a sample Linux terminal output after running Caliper.
Figure 2.10 presents the throughput and latency of the proposed blockchain implementation
at various transaction rates. We observed the maximum throughput of 35 tps. With the
increasing transaction rate, the latency keeps increasing, as the accumulated and queued
transactions need to be held at the orderer nodes. The performance of the Hyperledger
Fabric network depends on various factors, such as chaincode execution time, endorsement
delay, network delay, consensus delay among multiple orderers, and block validation delay.
It is important to note here that the hardcore performance evaluation of the Hyperledger
Fabric platform is not the main objective of this experiment. Several works have measured
the performance evaluation of the Hyperledger framework with detailed metrics and com-
prehensive analysis. Here, we measure the performance metrics (throughput and latency)
of the prototype system to prove our proposed framework’s applicability. We also show our
proposed framework’s applicability in a multi-host scenario for a similar blockchain network
model, detailed in Appendix A.
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2.5.6.4 Operational Cost of Consortium Blockchain
Costs linked with the system activity, such as the system setup, execution, or mainte-
nance, are shared within the consortium according to a pre-established governance scheme.
The consortium’s incentive to build and maintain blockchain infrastructure is to detect
counterfeits in the IC supply chain. Individual companies can leverage the same resources
for various other blockchain applications. Additionally, for regular system maintenance, a
consortium node is rewarded a small fee (e.g., some ETH) when it validates any transaction
committed by a customer for ownership transfer. Selecting appropriate values for transfer
reward will depend on the consortium members’ actual investment for the implementation.
However, such a topic is outside the scope of our current research, and thus it will not be
considered further.
2.6 Analysis of the Protocols
In this section, we analyze the security, privacy, and reliability issues of the proposed
blockchain-based IC traceability protocol; and discuss our proposed protocol’s performance
in terms of scalability and resource requirements.
2.6.1 Security
Double-spending by the seller: Once the transaction is complete and added to
the blockchain by a seller, the buyer becomes the only person authorized to update the
blockchain for a particular IC. Hence, the seller cannot falsely attempt another sale. A
malicious buyer can also mount a double-spend attack. In this attack scenario, the attacker
makes a payment transaction that moves funds to the seller’s address. After the transaction
appears in the newest block on the main branch, the attacker takes possession of the IC. The
attacker then releases two blocks immediately, using his mining power, with a transaction
in the first that transfers the funds to a second attacker-owned address. Now the attacker
has the IC and his funds back. However, this type of double-spend attack is a fundamental
security issue in any blockchain system, and several solutions have been proposed in the
literature [47,163] to counter these threats, as described in Section 1.1.3.
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Seller’s refusal to transfer IC: Following the previous point, the buyer can use the
blockchain to take legal action against the seller if the seller refuses to transfer the IC to the
buyer. A supply chain participant’s integrity and legitimacy are ensured during registration
when it joins the system and gets its private/public keys (Section 2.4.2.1).
Possible man-in-the-middle attack: An attacker may mount a man-in-the-middle
attack during ownership transfer. First, a malicious party gets valid CRPs of an authentic
device from the blockchain and hardcodes those CRPs into his counterfeit device. Then,
he proves to a potential buyer that his device (a counterfeit one) shows correct CRPs. Our
proposed protocol resists against such attacks. In our proposed protocol, a potential buyer
performs two-step authentication: (i) verifying the ownership information, (ii) authenticat-
ing the IC with Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs). Even if the attacker can prove the valid
CRPs from his counterfeit device, he cannot prove his ownership of the device because the
blockchain record will show the genuine owner’s information corresponding to that CRP
authentication data.
De-centralized verification and authentication: In a traditional authentication
process, a centralized Verification Authority (or Verifier) possesses a large set of CRPs for
each IC, enrolled prior to sale. The Verifier can only perform authentication of a device
in the field. Our protocol provides the flexibility for any potential buyer to authenticate a
chip.
Modeling attack resistance: An IC’s buyer verifies CRPs on the actual physical
device against the records in blockchain tracing back to the manufacturer. In this instance,
a software model [184] of the PUF is irrelevant and cannot be used to mount an attack.
Unless the chip is provisioned with an Artificial Neural Network (ANN), it cannot clone
the PUF. Provisioning a chip with ANN, solely for cloning increases die area and accrues
additional cost. If an attacker chooses this route, there will be a cost explosion since each
chip’s software model has to be learned separately.
Security against malicious foundries: If a third party foundry (contract manufac-
turer) or assembly wants to behave maliciously, our proposed approach gives no incentive to
do that. For example, if a foundry creates a bad genesis transaction that is not authenticated
by the on-chip PUF, it cannot sell that part. If the foundry creates a genesis transaction,
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which is authenticated by the PUF, but the chip is a bad one, then the buyer precisely knows
who is responsible. Besides, if the manufacturer provides incorrect PUF data, the IP owner
cannot sell the chip and loses trust in the manufacturer. Moreover, if the manufacturer leaks
the PUF data, still it is infeasible to build hardware with a cloned PUF. Any effort by a
malicious foundry to overproduce ICs is defeated by the locking scheme described in Section
2.5.4.2. Thus, the manufacturer has no incentive to become an attacker.
Consortium blockchain security: The consortium members control the consen-
sus process and write the consortium blockchain with transactional data. Since the cus-
tomers cannot participate in the consensus process, they cannot compromise the consortium
blockchain’s security and privacy.
2.6.2 Privacy
Transparency vs privacy: The proposed protocol shows that an entity performs all
the transactions using a single address. This address re-use may raise some privacy concerns
for the customers. One possible approach to address the issue is to assign multiple addresses
to each participant.
Consortium blockchain vs public blockchain: There are several advantages of a
consortium blockchain over a public blockchain. First, if the read permissions are restricted,
consortium blockchain can provide a greater level of privacy [54]. Moreover, the consortium
can, if desired, change the rules of the blockchain. Since the transactions need to be verified
only by a select number of nodes, transactions are cheaper in validation overheads. Any
accidental fault can be quickly fixed, as the nodes are very well connected.
2.6.3 Reliability
Authentication by Strong PUFs: The genesis block is assumed to have enough PUF
data to disambiguate the IC from millions of other devices [175]. To increase the number of
authentication events, the PUF can be re-mined during each ownership transfer event, and
the new data can be included in challenge and hashResponse fields of the transaction format.
The hashing of PUF responses prevents their exposure in the blockchain and ensures only
the IC’s physical owners can re-generate the hash. The re-mining process can also check the
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reliability of the PUF, which can be affected by aging over the product lifetime, and update
the blockchain accordingly.
Authentication by Weak PUFs: To generate stable keys from the Weak PUF, several
literature works have proposed solutions, such as accelerated device aging [112,113], built-in
self-test [43], Helper Data Algorithm, also known as a Fuzzy Extractor [64]. The helper data
can be generated during the enrollment phase and stored in a non-volatile memory present
in the chip. It can be constructed to become known to an adversary without compromising
the secrecy of the PUF response, i.e., it does not need to be kept secret [69,182]. During the
authentication stage, the secret key can be reconstructed, combining the response from the
PUF and helper data from the non-volatile memory. Alternatively, a non-volatile memory-
based PUF can be used for authentication, which does not require any helper data [58]. If
PUF is sufficiently reliable, then producing helper data may be omitted.
2.6.4 Performance
Scalability: Our proposed protocols allow the registration and ownership transfer of
multiple ICs in a single transaction between two parties by utilizing the multiple inputs op-
tion in the transaction format and the smart contract functions. The consortium blockchain
eliminates the cost of transaction fees and improves the efficiency by using a non-resource
intensive consensus algorithm. As a result, a consortium blockchain could minimize the cost
of the supply chain’s daily operations, which is ideal for supply chain traceability. Table 2.4
presents the comparative performance analysis of our traceability protocol implementations
in Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric.
Low power and low cost authentication: The PUF consumes dynamic power only
during the authentication process - when it generates the response. The power required dur-
ing authentication is small. Also, the PUF is a low-cost, lightweight root-of-trust, enabling
easier integration.
Simple, robust authentication: PUFs enable fast, secure authentication of the ICs
due to their unclonability and light footprint. Furthermore, the PUF information can be
updated in the blockchain during each transfer and provides a future buyer with more data
points to verify IC authenticity.
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Table 2.4: Comparative Performance Analysis of the Proposed IC Traceability Protocol.
Ethereum Hyperledger Fabric
Permissions Permissionless Permissioned
Consensus mechanism PoW PBFT
Access to Data Public Restricted or Public
Node Scalability High Low
Block Generation Time 15 seconds 0.4 seconds
Throughput 15 tps 35 tps
Benchmark Tools EVMremix Caliper
Programming Solidity Go
Cryptocurrency Ethereum None
Flexible consensus mechanisms: Permissioned platforms have semi-trusted mem-
bers where only known participating nodes that are part of a consortium are verified and
registered. These groups are expected to be small in number and, therefore, can employ
alternative consensus mechanisms. Achieving consensus in a distributed system has known
solutions in the research literature, e.g., Paxos [133], RAFT [162], and various Byzantine
Fault Tolerance algorithms [56]. Permissioned blockchain platforms have primarily adopted
these consensus algorithms.
2.6.5 Practicality of the Proposed Protocol
Our proposed authentication and the overall traceability protocol are highly suitable for
a computing system where the IC is part of a system, such as System on Chips (SOCs),
computer motherboard systems, automotive ECUs, etc. These systems can be connected
to the Internet, and using our blockchain protocol allows all the ICs of the system to be
authenticated simultaneously.
Figure 2.11 presents how automotive security can be ensured during any ownership
transfer using our IC traceability protocol via blockchain pegged to embedded Weak PUFs.
Modern automobiles contain more than 70 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) networked
together [186]. The overall safety of the vehicle relies on the authenticity of various ECUs.
The security of a car can be compromised by connecting counterfeit ECU in a vehicle
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Figure 2.11: Schematic of typical in-vehicle network architecture of a modern automobile.
All inter-bus communication is done exclusively only over the gateway ECU. CAN - Con-
troller Area Network, MOST - Media Oriented Systems Transport.
communication network. A counterfeit ECU from any malicious party can threaten the
functioning of steering, brakes, airbags, windows, headlights, etc [217].This threat gives rise
to the safety concern of people in and around the car. To circumvent this, we propose our
traceability protocol, by which a buyer can authenticate the provenance of all ECUs during
any ownership transfer.
In the proposed protocol, a centralized gateway ECU connects all existing bus systems.
During device enrollment, all accredited OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturer) of the
respective vehicle enroll the ECUs by issuing registerDevice(). The vehicle manufac-
turer enlists device IDs of all ECUs in the gateway security ECU. At any stage of the
supply chain, a potential buyer can verify the ownership and the provenance of the ECUs
by invoking checkOwnership() with the list of device IDs obtained form the gateway secu-
rity ECU. He can authenticate all the ECUs connected in the vehicle network by invoking
authenticateDevice().
For authentication, the blockchain sends the public keys of all ECUs to the buyer’s wallet.
The buyer’s wallet sends a challenge message to the gateway security ECU via a PassThru
device [186]. The gateway ECU collects the signatures from all ECUs, including its own,
and sends back to the buyer’s wallet. The buyer’s wallet can verify the digital signature for
the authenticity of the device.
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2.7 Limitations ans Discussion
Cloning PUFs: Recent literature work has shown that PUFs can be tampered by
Focused Ion Beam (FIB) to create clones [93]. However, FIB based tampering is costly and
would have to be performed on a per chip basis to obtain multiple clones. The authors
in [181] conjectured that the FIB attack might not be possible for the ICs with 32nm or
smaller feature nodes.
Authenticity of Analog and Mixed-signal Circuits: The number of counterfeit
analog ICs has been increasing at an alarming rate [25]. Our proposed solution is for
ICs with embedded PUFs and is agnostic to the device’s type, whether analog, digital or
mixed-signal. The solution is easily extended to analog and mixed-signal circuits (with
analog PUFS [66], or package IDs [62], [154], [128]) but is outside the scope of the current
work. Since the blockchain is pegged to PUF for authentication, legacy devices without any
authentication mechanism are not supported by this solution.
Transparency vs Privacy: An open research question regarding our proposed pro-
tocol is how both the transparency requirement for supply chain tracking and anonymity
requirements for maintaining users’ privacy can be satisfied. This requirement is of par-
ticular importance to IP owners selling millions of devices as it can be infeasible to create
millions of public-private key pairs. In future works, we plan to investigate possible solutions
to address this issue.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we outline a novel methodology to establish IC traceability via blockchain
technology and PUFs. The blockchain allows legitimate parties to track an IC over its entire
lifetime. We use embedded PUFs to provide a simple, secure, and robust authentication
process at every point-of-sale. The protocol automates the entire process of authentication,
ownership transfer by using the smart contract. Our approach does not impose onerous
restrictions on the participants in the blockchain; instead, the underlying technology guar-
antees the integrity of the system even in the face of dishonesty or idleness. This approach
provides a technological solution to a supply chain problem.
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CHAPTER 3
PRESERVING IOT PRIVACY IN SHARING ECONOMY VIA SMART
CONTRACTS
3.1 Introduction
For widespread adoption of the ever-expanding IoT, privacy and anonymity must be
integrated into its design by giving users control of their privacy. Privacy is the right of
individuals or cooperative users to maintain confidentiality and control over their information
when disclosed to another party. In IoT applications, privacy threats can arise from the
perspective of IoT devices’ users and their data. Any unauthorized access could unexpectedly
initiate privacy threats and attacks. One good example of this is the ‘sharing economy’.
Sharing economy platforms such as Airbnb have recently flourished in the tourism industry.
In a sharing economy platform, a centralized third-party usually provides the technical
infrastructure, user interfaces, and the guidance/monitoring process.
However, relying on a centralized third-party sharing platform inevitably leads to a
single point of weakness, higher fees, lack of trust, and governance issues for both users and
service providers [28]. It creates an inherent bias, fraud, and a single point of weakness in
the system. Such intermediaries charge a large service fee (up to 15% for guests and up to
5% commission of the homeowner), can arbitrarily change the terms and conditions [28].
Moreover, sharing any IoT-devices enabled smart houses poses a severe threat to user’s
privacy. Airbnb hosts prefer to know what is going on in their rentals. Because of this,
hosts may opt to have surveillance cameras in key places. This surveillance allows Airbnb
hosts to spy on guests, which is a severe infringement of the guests’ privacy expectations.
Similarly, by accessing the smart door lock, an intrusive homeowner can compromise the
security system. By accessing the stored credentials on connected devices, hosts can take
control of the IoT devices’ sensors and can even disable an apartment’s control of HVAC
systems [153].
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In this chapter, we propose smart contracts to eliminate (i) distrust in the third-party
controlled home-sharing economy by decentralization and (ii) privacy threats from IoT-
enabled telematics devices in a sharing house [106,109,171]. In our proposed solution, which
is based on the Ethereum blockchain network, the shared IoT devices are directly connected
to the blockchain and are controlled by a smart contract through which they receive and
update their security parameters and the serving user’s information. The proposed method
ensures exclusive access to the IoT devices seamlessly through blockchain smart contracts.
We organize the chapter as follows. Section 3.2 presents a threat model in a conventional
home-sharing economy and then describes our proposed solution’s motivation. Section 3.3
gives an overview of the related literary works on sharing resources in different IoT ecosys-
tems and enforcing supervised access to those resources. Section 3.4 describes our proposed
protocol to preserve IoT privacy in the sharing economy via smart contracts, and Section
3.5 outlines the hardware collateral required for the protocol. Section 3.6 presents a demon-
stration of the proposed protocol, and finally, Section 3.8 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Threat Model and Motivation
In this section, we present the security, trust, and privacy threats in a conventional
home-sharing economy and then describe our motivation for the proposed solution.
3.2.1 Threat Model
Figure 3.1 presents the trust, and privacy threats in a conventional home-sharing econ-
omy, such as Airbnb. Here, firstly, renting out a unit on Airbnb requires multiple levels of
trust. Both host and guest have to trust Airbnb’s ability and integrity regarding booking
and payment processes. In such a scenario, Airbnb is the provider of the user interfaces,
technical infrastructure, and the guidance/monitoring process. Moreover, it is also respon-
sible for providing services such as insurance and the user’s reputation management. By
doing so, Airbnb is the only responsible for establishing and maintaining trust among users.
Unfortunately, current mechanisms cannot cope with malicious behaviors, high service and
transaction fees, strategic lies, and the formation of deceiving coalitions. Therefore, there is
a need for a critical technological innovation since no centralized entity nor an intermediary
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Figure 3.1: Threats associated with accessing indoor IP camera by home-owner from remote
location in a home-sharing economy scenario.
can address these problems [155]. Additionally, an intrusive homeowner can compromise
the privacy of the tenant by accessing the connected IoT devices. For example, the data
collected by the IP camera in a rental property cannot be shared with the owner of the
property while it is occupied by a tenant.
3.2.2 Motivation
Protection of Trust The sharing economy is a case of a consumer to consumer (C2C)
business model. Contrary to other business models, where companies sell their products or
services to other businesses (B2B) or consumers (B2C), companies in a sharing economy
are only middlemen who can be cut out of the process by establishing an alternative source
of trust between consumers. Thus, the sharing economy is uniquely suited to decentraliza-
tion via the blockchain. For IoT in the home-sharing economy, blockchain can provide an
infrastructure for direct, safe, and secure transfers between devices, without the need for
a centralized authority. Smart contracts can translate the existing contractual clauses into
embedded hardware and software so that it can self-verify that conditions have been met
to execute the contract. Smart contracts contain code functions and interact with other
contracts, make decisions, store data, and send tokens/money to others.
Protection of Privacy Smart contracts can also facilitate efficient IoT devices by au-
tomating their operations and decision making. We can achieve this automation by allowing
IoT devices to interact with smart contracts and make decisions defined by the fixed con-
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Figure 3.2: Block diagram of a Trusted Platform Module (green block) embedded into the
camera’s software architecture [8].
tract logic. For example, in order to safeguard surveillance data, modern IP cameras are
equipped with an onboard security chip, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [8]. Using a sym-
metric cryptographic key, the TPM encrypts the data stream (Figure 3.2). In this work, we
leverage the TPM to change its encryption key whenever a tenancy change is recorded in the
smart contract. This key can only be computed using the device and the tenant’s private
key so that no one else can access the surveillance data other than the current tenant.
3.3 Related Works
Privacy is a concern whenever common resources are shared. Wolf et al. [218] proposed a
new IoT architecture, which facilitates the horizontal integration of different IoT ecosystems.
The proposed work assumes that the owner controls the resource being shared at all times,
and only supervised access to that resource can be granted to the requester by the owner. The
main drawback of such a solution is that there is no provisioning in it by which the requester
can ensure the privacy of its access to that resource. Although this privacy concern is not
a significant problem in various IoT applications, such as sharing the data collected from
temperature sensors deployed in a farm, it could be crucial for other types of applications,
such as home-sharing, car-sharing.
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3.4 Proposed Methodology
Figure 3.3 presents our proposed protocol showing the role of all entities (the manufac-
turer, owner, tenant, IoT device, blockchain) to preserve IoT privacy in the home-sharing
economy. The protocol consists of the following steps.
3.4.1 Implementing Smart Contract
In the first step of our proposed protocol, the manufacturer of an IoT device (an IP
camera, for example, in our case) creates a smart contract (possessionContract in Figure
3.3). This contract offers functions for managing the possession transfer and polling the
possession of the device. The manufacturer then deploys the contract in blockchain and
embeds the address of the contract in the device. The IP camera may either ship with the
smart contract’s address baked into it, or the blockchain nodes can find out about it via a
discovery service [76].
The smart contract consists of code (its functions) and data (its state). The contract
functions are setDeviceInfo, sendDeposit, transferTenancy, pollTenancy, and the state
variables are owner, owner’s public key, tenant, tenant’s public key, device identifier, device
public key, rental status (rented/unrented), rent initiation date, rental period. Once the
smart contract is deployed in the blockchain, the IoT device executes according to the smart
contract’s states. The IP camera queries the contract, finds the tenant and changes the
video data encryption key. The manufacturer sets the first buyer as the owner of the device.
3.4.2 Transferring Tenancy to a Tenant
To fulfill this protocol, the smart contract stores an internal list of IoT devices, along
with their owner information and their respective rental prices. New devices are added to
this list, and the owner can adjust the prices in this list by calling setDeviceInfo, the
function to set the minimum deposit, prices, and types. When a prospective tenant creates
a transaction sendDeposit to send a deposit, it includes the device information so that the
smart contract can keep a list of tenants and their deposits for each device, along with the
prices at the time of deposit.
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Figure 3.3: Detailed diagram showing the role of all entities in the proposed IoT privacy
protection protocol.
The owner can check this list to ensure that a deposit has been made before providing
access to his/her property. To transfer the tenancy to a tenant, the owner sends a transaction
transferTenancy() to the possessionContract. Algorithm 5 shows the contract function
transferTenancy() used in our proposed methodology. This transaction defines all the
necessary information related to a tenancy transfer, such as new tenant information, tenancy
starting time, tenancy period. The transaction includes the tenant’s public key, which will
be used by the IoT device for computing the data encryption key. If the transaction’s sender
is the current owner of the device, the smart contract updates its new tenant and the new
tenant public key.
ALGORITHM 5: Pseudo-code of transferTenancy() for transferring tenancy to the tenant.
Inputs: Device identifier (deviceIdentifier)Tenant’s public key (pubKeyTenant), and tenancy
period (tenancyPeriod)
if msg.sender is the owner AND deviceIdentifier is available then
Set pubKeyTenant as the target feed in the deviceIdentifier
Change Subscription time to tenancyPeriod





Figure 3.4: Detailed diagram of the tenancy transfer protocol.
3.4.3 Establishing a Shared Encryption Key
The device interacts with the blockchain network and polls the smart contract periodi-
cally by querying the function pollTenancy(). We present the details of device interaction
methods with blockchain in Chapter 6. The pollTenancy() function returns the tenant’s
public key to the requesting device. For video stream encryption purposes, the IP camera
establishes a symmetric key using the Diffie-Hellman protocol [67]. On the one hand, the
device calculates the symmetric key using its private key stored secretly inside the device
and the tenant’s public key from the smart contract. On the other hand, the tenant calcu-
lates the symmetric key using his private key and the device public key. The computation is
based on a pre-established large prime number (p) and a generator (g), which is a primitive
root modulo p.
After the tenant includes the public key in the smart contract, the IP camera can encrypt
the video data with the tenant’s public key, and the tenant can decrypt the data with a pri-
vate key using any standard Public Key Cryptography (PKC) algorithm. However, for large
data like video stream, encryption/decryption with asymmetric PKC (e.g., RSA, ECC) is
very slow. Instead, we choose symmetric key cryptography (AES) for encryption/decryption,
which is several orders of magnitude faster.
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Figure 3.5: Detailed diagram of the privacy protection protocol: (1) the smart contract
notifies the IP camera about the tenancy change, (2) IP camera computes the symmetric
key from tenant’s public key and encrypts video data, (3) tenant calculates the symmetric
key and decrypts the video data. The dotted lines indicate inaccessible data.
Tenant’s public key, T = gt mod p,
Device public key, D = gd mod p
Next, the public keys are exchanged via smart contract. The tenant and the device
computes a shared symmetric key (s) using their private keys.
Tenant computes s = Dt mod p = gdt mod p,
Device computes s = T d mod p = gdt mod p
3.4.4 Encrypting IoT Data with the Shared Encryption Key
The encryption engine of the TPM changes the encryption key to the newly computed
symmetric key. Then it encrypts all the video data stream or other payload with encryption
key (Figure 3.5). The tenant can also decrypt the video data with the shared key. On
the other hand, the owner can no longer decrypt the surveillance data as the key has been
changed.
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3.4.5 Change of Encryption Key after Tenancy Period
The transferTenancy function in possessionContract defines that during the tenancy
period, the tenant will have the possession of the device. After the tenancy period, the
original owner will have the device’s possession, and the encryption key will be changed
according to the original owner’s public key. As the smart contracts are reactive entities, in
order to terminate them, one should trigger them. The owner does this termination once the
rental period is over. The trigger message is only accepted and processed by the contract
if it comes from the owner and if the contract period is over. Upon receiving the trigger
message, if the rental period is over, the contract reverts the device’s rental state to unrented,
which means that the camera will no longer use the renter’s information to send its feed.
The camera then uses the owner’s public key to calculate the symmetric key and redirects
the encrypted stream to the owner’s address. With the trigger message, the payment and
change (deposit minus payment) are also sent to the owner and the tenant, respectively.
3.5 Hardware Collateral for the Smart Contract
For implementing the proposed smart contract, the IP camera’s system-on-chip (SoC)
needs to be equipped with an encryption engine, such as AES, DES, 3DES etc. Most of the
modern IP cameras are equipped with such security engines for safeguarding the data [8].
Similar privacy protection methodology can be applied to any other IoT devices present in
a home. Alternatively, a Smart Home Hub [187] can perform the privacy protection for all
the IoT devices connected to it.
3.6 Protocol Demonstration and Discussion
We implemented the proposed protocol in Solidity programming language and eval-
uated in terms of its operational cost. The code is publicly accessible in Github reposi-
tory [27]. In particular, we calculated the total cost by measuring the total gas amount
(execution fee for each operation made in Ethereum) for all of the functions involved in
the process, that is, (i) registering device (registerDevice()), (ii) transferring ownership
(transferOwnership()), and (iii) transferring tenancy (transferTenancy()) and then con-
verting it into USD (Table 3.1). For practical implementation, the protocol can be imple-
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Table 3.1: Operation cost for the proposed smart contract transactions.
Operation Gas limit Gas price Cost (in ETH) Cost (in USD)
registerDevice() 121478 10.89 ×10−9 0.0013229 0.463
transferOwnership() 30365 10.89 ×10−9 0.00033067 0.116
transferTenancy() 23365 10.89 ×10−9 0.00023067 0.08
mented in an application and all the steps, like creating transaction, verifying ownership,
authenticating the device, transferring the tenancy can be done by using the application.
Participants can mange their keys and addresses using a digital wallet.
3.7 Limitations and Discussion
Data Storage on the Blockchain In a decentralized sharing economy platform, the
data need to be securely stored on the blockchain. However, storing all data on a blockchain
database distributed across thousands of nodes is hugely inefficient. Therefore, not all data
should be stored on the blockchain – only items that are sensitive and need to be stored
securely like transactions, identities, core property information, reviews, etc. Items like
property descriptions, indexes for searching, and photos change regularly and should not be
stored within the blockchain. More centralized applications could be built on a secondary
layer above the blockchain, which can act as a window into the system – but keep its core
USP (User Services Platform) the same.
Reduced Operational Governance Control One major limitation of a blockchain-
based sharing economy is reduced operational governance control of the provider’s actual
service level. In general, federal, state, or local authorities always regulate businesses offering
rental services. In the sharing economy, however, unlicensed individuals offering rental
services may not obey these regulations. For example, there are reports of users who find
their bikes provided by the owners of Mobike severely destroyed, with a little chance of
compensation.
Listing All IoT Devices The hosts may have hidden video or audio surveillance
equipment to monitor the guests. These hidden remotely-connected IoT devices violate the
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guests’ expectations of privacy. Our proposed protocol necessitates that the owner has to
enlist all blockchain-enabled IoT devices in the smart contract for preserving privacy.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
Sharing IoT devices introduces new opportunities for innovation, but at the same time,
it makes it challenging to ensure private access to the resources being shared. To avoid
the cost overhead of a trusted third party supervising the private access to the resource,
we proposed the alternative solution of using blockchain technology. Our proposed protocol
preserves the IoT privacy by facilitating the change of encryption key via smart contracts.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPROVING RELIABILITY OF WEAK PUFS VIA ACCELERATED
AGING
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have used Weak PUFs for device-unique key generation
and authentication. Among the Weak PUFs, SRAM-like PUFs have become prominent in
the industry as part of secure key/ID generation functions [98]. SRAM-like Weak PUFs
utilize the mismatch in the device characteristics of the cross-coupled inverters, due to
manufacturing process variation, to settle into a particular logical state upon power-on.
These power-on states are random across cells. Ideally, a Weak PUF should reproduce the
same output behavior during each power-on operation, i.e., the PUF should be reliable.
However, due to environmental variations, noise or aging, a Weak PUF output can become
erroneous. The problem is exacerbated if the inherent mismatch between the cross-coupled
inverters in SRAM-like Weak PUF is small. Hence, the intended use of Weak PUFs for
key/ID generation is negatively impacted.
Among the prior approaches to improve PUF reliability, accelerating device aging or
burn-in has received increasing attention [42, 84, 148]. In accelerated aging, devices are
subjected to temperature and voltage stress in a burn-in chamber. For SRAM-like Weak
PUFs, the burn-in process can increase the inherent mismatch between the cross-couple
inverters so that a PUF output attains stronger immunity to noise.
While burn-in is beneficial, it can significantly inflate production costs due to long baking
times to maximize the number of reliable integrated circuits (ICs). The straightforward way
to determine the bake times is to account for the worst-case design corners. This worst-case
design consideration can prove detrimental to the utilization of PUFs in low-cost applica-
tions, like Smart Cards, and for high volume manufacturing. Hence, there is a compelling
need to reduce burn-in time. Integrating a mechanism for the IC to provide certain in-
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formation to the manufacturer to aid in calculating the minimum burn-in time, without
compromising the security of the PUF, can prove advantageous and offer a considerable
increase in manufacturing throughput.
In this chapter, we present a method to reduce the burn-in time by quantifying the
minimum burn-in requirements for each Weak PUF cell [113]. We use a low-cost proxy
to represent the inherent cross-coupled inverter mismatch in terms of the PUF error rate.
The error rates of the instantiated PUFs in an IC are measured and used to decide the
burn-in requirements. We present a low-overhead architecture to automate the collection of
necessary data. Also, the effect of alternate SRAM-like PUF designs and different transistor
technology implementations on the burn-in process are analyzed.
4.2 Background and Motivation
In this section, we discuss some relevant background with regards to device aging and
burn-in. We also discuss the temporal majority voting (TMV) technique in detail as we
will utilize this in our methodology. We also present the prior research regarding previous
techniques for improving Weak PUF reliability.
4.2.1 Weak PUF
In the hardware security context, literature works have proposed SRAM cells for use
as Weak PUFs [98]. Due to process variation, the transistor parameters of an SRAM cell
are skewed from their nominal value, making the cell asymmetrical. The random nature
of process variation results in a unique start-up pattern of an SRAM memory array, which
can be used as a device fingerprint. The most common design of an SRAM cell is the 6T
structure consisting of two cross-coupled inverters and two access transistors. SRAM-based
Weak PUFs generate their random bits by amplifying the mismatches in process variations
in two (or more) transistors using a positive feedback structure. However, when these
mismatches are small, different environmental variations, ambient noise, or aging can often
affect the PUF outputs resulting in some bits of the raw PUF response being unreliable.
Recent hardware studies have shown that various environmental variations can result in the
unreliability of 6− 8% in the PUF response bits [142].
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Figure 4.1: SRAM-like cross-coupled inverter PUF cell (Ref ) [213]
To circumvent the need for multiple power-ups of the SRAM PUFs, we modify the basic
cell, as shown in Figure 4.1, to efficiently allow multiple evaluations of a cell’s output in the
presence of noise [213]. The circuit, termed as Ref, works using pre-charge and discharge
cycles. During pre-charge (EN = 0), the output nodes are raised to supply level (Vdd,1
and Vdd,2) and M7 (footer) prevents short-circuit current consumption. In the evaluation
phase (EN = 1), the process variation of the transistors creates discharge paths of different
strengths. This allows the circuit to settle to either logic-1 or logic-0. The effect of noise on
the outputs is simulated by adding noise voltages to Vdd,1 and Vdd,2. This design is similar
to changes required to enable Temporal Majority Voting (TMV) in related work [148] and
to Sense-Amplifier PUF [41].
4.2.2 PUF Reliability
Fuzzy extraction has been explored to derive stable keys from biometric data and, for
authentication of such data [70]. For improving the reliability of Weak PUFs, application of
error-correction codes (ECCs) and fuzzy extractors requires generating and utilizing helper
data [50, 64, 143, 144, 146], which is made public. For ECC implementations, a stable key
of the desired length needs a large number of initial Weak PUF bits, even with helper data
[50]. The intrinsic error rate of a Weak PUF cell increases as the process variation reduces,
which is the case as a technology node matures. An increase in PUF error rate increases the
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initial bits required to derive a stable key of the same length and increases the helper data
needed for fuzzy extraction and error correction.
Circuit and device-level solutions can improve the Weak PUF cell reliability, provid-
ing alternatives to costly ECC. Pre-selecting SRAM-based Weak PUF cells that exhibit a
greater degree of transistor threshold voltage mismatch has been proposed by Hofer et al.
to improve the reliability of the system [97]. Layout techniques and resettable logic were
shown to reduce the influence of systematic process variations by Su et al. [199]. Jang and
Ghosh [116] proposed extensions over a conventional 6T SRAM cell by incorporating PMOS
latches and using Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) devices to protect against environmental
fluctuations. Alternate configurations of the inverters in the SRAM cell have been explored
by Ganta and Nazhandali to reduce the variations with respect to temperature and hence,
decrease the number of unreliable bits that need error correction [83]. Bucci and Luzzi [52]
constructed a differential circuit to capture the process mismatch and amplify it to reduce
the effect of noise on the PUF cell output. Patil et al. [166] further explored various con-
figurations of SRAM-like Weak PUFs that exhibit higher sensitivity to process variations,
resulting in greater resilience to thermal noise. The higher sensitivity allows the PUF cells to
be immune to noise even in mature technology nodes. Cortez et al. [60] proposed adapting
voltage ramp-up time to ambient temperature to reduce the error rate of memory PUFs.
However, the auxiliary circuits needed for voltage ramp-up accrue a large area overhead,
and shaping the supply voltage becomes complex in large circuits.
The effect of aging on PUF reliability has been studied extensively by Garg et al. [84],
and Maes et al. proposed techniques to counter the effects [145]. Bhargava et al. [42] utilized
aging via Hot carrier injection (HCI) aided PUF reliability.
4.2.3 Temporal Majority Voting
The area overhead from implementing traditional ECC blocks and the number of initial
PUF bits required scales superlinearly as the error rate increases. A simple, circuit-based
way to reduce the error rate using Temporal Majority Voting (TMV) has been explored by
Mathew et al. [148] and Xiao et al. [220]. Mathew et al. [148] also explored burn-in and
dark bits evaluation to reduce error rates. Design changes were required to enable voting,
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and synchronous design helped improve uniqueness. However, the approach can only correct
error rates of < 8 %, and additional techniques are necessary for practical applications.
In this work, we will assume a simple counter-based TMV for error correction during
the regular operation of the PUF. For example, a simple 4-bit counter-based TMV counts
from 0 to 15 and can be used for 15-way voting. If the resultant value after 15 evaluations
of the cell’s response is greater than 8, then the final value can be classified as 1, or else it
can be classified as 0. The mathematical model of the TMV is a binomial counting process,
and hence, the reduction in error rate can be calculated analytically. For example, a PUF









where k = (N + 1)/2 (as N is odd) when an N -way voting is used [132]. The circuit
implementation of the TMV typically consists of an n-bit counter where N = 2n − 1 . The
counter is incremented by 1 if the response from the PUF cell is 1.
Using (4.1), we plot the initial and final error rates for 4-bit (15-way), 5-bit (31-way) and
6-bit (63-way) TMVs in Figure 4.2. The TMV selection would be based on the maximum
error rate that the system needs to correct (final error rate ≤ 10−6). We utilize a 4-bit TMV
for regular operation for this work, noting that it can correct a maximum error of 6%.
4.2.4 Negative Bias Temperature Instability
Transistor aging has become a significant reliability concern for current CMOS technol-
ogy. Among various aging mechanisms, Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) is considered
the dominant aging mechanism, causing the threshold voltage of the transistor to increase.
There are two BTI mechanisms: (i) Negative BTI (NBTI) affecting the PMOS transistors
and (ii) Positive BTI (PBTI) affecting the NMOS transistors. NBTI results from continuous
trap generation in Si-SiO2 interface when a negative voltage is applied to the PMOS gate
(stress). Under stressed operating conditions (i.e., On-state, negative gate bias at elevated
temperature and supply voltage), Si-H bonds near the interface continue to break and gen-
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Figure 4.2: Error rate reduction due to Temporal Majority Voting
erate interfacial traps that contribute to an increase in Vth. Due to the Vth degradation,
NBTI results in poor drive current, lower noise margin, and shorter device lifetime.
The NBTI-induced threshold voltage shift is a function of supply voltage, temperature,
and many technology parameters. Various models have been proposed in the literature to
accurately estimate the threshold voltage degradation of ∆Vth due to NBTI. Kang et al.
proposed a compact threshold voltage degradation model considering the temporal NBTI
variation in short channel devices [121]. Paul et al. showed that the maximum circuit delay
degradation due to NBTI closely follows the same fractional power dependency to time as
the Vth degradation with an appropriate scale factor [167]. Kumar et al. have proposed
an efficient AC NBTI model for circuit simulations [130]. Vattikonda et al. have proposed
a further improved circuit compatible NBTI model to consider AC relaxation effects and
technology-dependent parameters [211].
FinFET : The NBTI model for FinFETs is the same as (4.2.4). The effect of NBTI and
mitigation techniques for FinFET SRAMs have been explored in detail by Wang et al. [216].
















Kv = f(Vdd − Vth, T )
where α is the duty cycle, T is the temperature, Tclk is the clock cycle, and other parameters
are technology parameters previously defined in [40].
4.2.5 Burn-In (Accelerated Aging)
IC designers and manufacturers are concerned about quality and reliability over a prod-
uct’s lifetime. To ensure economic viability, it is desirable to remove defective devices from
the population before shipping them to the customer. Consequently, many ICs undergo a
burn-in process after fabrication to accelerate failures that manifest in early-life, which are
primarily caused by process and manufacturing defects. However, under burn-in conditions,
increased junction temperature (average temperature of the silicon substrate) increases the
leakage current, and increased leakage current further increases the junction temperature.
Thus, manufacturers try to control the junction temperature by removing the heat from
the IC. If the heat generation rate becomes greater than the rate of heat removal, junction
temperature starts increasing. This condition is called thermal runaway [209]. It has been
shown that the burn-in setup conditions must evolve by reducing either the ambient temper-
ature or the thermal resistance, or a combination of both. For example, in 130nm process
technology, the junction temperature should be kept below 110 °C with a thermal resistance
of 0.5 °C/W and an ambient temperature of 80 °C to avoid thermal runaway [209].
In the case of a Weak PUF, the response can be made more reliable by increasing the
magnitude of the difference in the threshold voltages of the two PMOS devices in the cross-
coupled inverters (M1, M3), in Figure 4.5. One such method of improving the reliability is
to exploit NBTI aging effects to reinforce the desired (or “golden”) response of the PUF cell.
This is done by finding the golden outputs (OUT, OUT ) of the PUF cell and forcing the
opposite values onto them via the access transistors (M5, M6). Increasing the temperature
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and/or applying voltage stress for a certain amount of time accelerates the devices’ aging in
a beneficial manner [42, 84, 148]. Hence, by improving the PUF reliability via burn-in, the
number of defective ICs is reduced.
4.2.6 PUF Reliability using accelerated aging
The aging effect on PUF reliability has been studied extensively by Garg et al. [84], and
Maes et al. proposed techniques to counter the effects [145]. Bhargava et al. [42] utilized
aging via Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) aided PUF reliability.
4.3 Methodology
This section discusses the PUF system design to enable the IC to output the maximum
error rate observed. Later, we elaborate on a mechanism to correlate the error rate to the
inherent mismatch in the PUF cell that allows us to find the burn-in time required to make
all the PUF cells reliable.
4.3.1 Weak PUF System Design
In Figure 4.3, we describe the proposed system to measure the maximum error rate in
a PUF. We described this system initially in our paper [112]. The system consists of a PUF
cell array connected to an array of multiplexers (Muxes). These muxes will direct the PUF
outputs to the relevant counters based on the mode of operation. A Central Control unit
oversees the entire operation of the PUF system. The circuit operates in two modes: (i)
Design for Reliability (DfR) mode and (ii) Regular Operation (OP) mode.
(i) Design for Reliability (DfR) mode: Before burn-in, the circuit is initialized into
(DfR) mode to obtain the maximum error rate among the PUF cells. The control unit
directs each PUF output via the MUX array to a 10-bit counter and performs 1024 pre-
charge and evaluations cycles on each cell. During every evaluation, the counter increments
if the output is logic-1. The large counter allows us to get an accurate measurement of the
error rate of a cell. Also, a single 10-bit counter is enough as this process is carried out
before burn-in and is not time intensive like burn-in. Even if a PUF cell takes 1ns for each
evaluation, then each cell error rate is obtained in ≈ 1µs.
61
Figure 4.3: Block Diagram of the proposed reliability enhancement scheme (from [112], our
earlier paper)
The counter value is fed to the Burn-in Optimizer unit that first determines the correct
PUF cell output. If the count is below 512 (ideally 0), then the correct output is determined
to be logic-0. If the counter is between 0 and 512, this count becomes the error rate for the
cell (out of 1023). For logic-1, the count would be > 512 (ideally 1023). To find the error
rate, we subtract the current count from 1023. The estimated logic value (PUF value) of
the PUF cell is fed back to the Central Control unit, which then writes the opposite value
to the PUF cell for burn-in.
The Burn-in Optimizer also maintains an internal register that stores the current max-
imum error rate (initialized to 0 on start-up). Each calculated error rate is compared to
the current maximum using a comparator and set as the new maximum if the error rate
is higher. All PUF cells are processed to obtain the final maximum error rate. Further
optimization is possible by utilizing the maximum error, 6%, that a 4-bit TMV can correct.
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The Error Threshold can be set to ≈ 62 (6% of 1023), and each calculated error rate is
compared against this before comparing with the stored maximum. The final IC output
(Max Error Rate) is the maximum error only if it is greater than the error threshold, and
otherwise, the output is a 0. Such ICs would not need burn-in as the TMV is sufficient.
In some instances, the designer may wish to account for an acceptable yield loss and use
more PUF cells than required. Hence, the Mask Array can be utilized to select the most
reliable PUF cells. The Burn-in Optimizer is used to set the mask bits to indicate reliable
cells. It can also possess an additional counter to keep track of cells with error rates of ≤ 6%
(for TMV). In case the system finds the required number of cells, it can output a 0 max
error rate to reduce burn-in requirements further. After burn-in, the Burn-in Optimizer can
be reused to set the final mask bits. Masking has been shown to help improve the reliability
of the Weak PUF system [148]. The Burn-in Optimizer’s entire operation is illustrated as a
flowchart, as shown in Figure 4.4.
(ii) Regular Operation (OP) mode: In this mode, the control unit queries and directs
the PUF outputs to the 4-bit TMVs. We can use multiple TMVs to speed up the PUF
evaluations for convenient real-time operation. As the burn-in process will have increased
the mismatch of the PUF cells by an appropriate amount, the TMVs should be able to
correct any observed errors as they will be well below the TMV threshold.
4.3.2 Process Variation and Error Rate
We utilize the SRAM cell design, whose operation is detailed in Section 4.2.1 and re-
illustrated in Figure 4.5 as the reference design, termed Ref.
Utilizing the maximum error rate produced by a PUF system, we aim to find the current
inherent mismatch, in terms of threshold voltages between the PMOS transistors (M1, M3),
in Figure 4.5. This maximum error rate acts as a proxy representing the inherent mismatch
between the cross-coupled elements in the actual PUF cell and will help us determine the
amount of NBTI aging needed to make the cell reliable.
To correlate the error rate with a threshold voltage mismatch value, we perform a set of
SPICE simulations on the Weak PUF cell. Circuit thermal noise is considered as the source
of errors in the PUF output. The noise is applied to the circuit in a differential manner at
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart illustrating the operation of Burn-in Optimizer
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Figure 4.5: SRAM-like cross-coupled inverter PUF cell (Ref ) [213]
Vdd,1 and Vdd,2, as shown Figure 4.5. The inherent mismatch of a PUF cell is approximated
by varying the threshold voltage in one of the PMOS transistors (M3 in our case) in steps of
1mV up to a certain maximum. A large number of evaluations are performed under varying
thermal noise for each step, and the error rate is calculated by comparing the values with
the output for zero thermal noise.
An example, as shown in Figure 4.6, plots the error rates against the increasing threshold
voltage mismatches for a PUF cell, as shown in Figure 4.5, in 45 nm technology [18] using
minimum sized transistors. This plot gives us an approximate correlation between the error
rate of a cell and the inherent PMOS transistors mismatch. Knowing that a 4-bit (15-way)
TMV can correct a maximum of 6% error, we see that any cell with an inherent mismatch
of ≥ 19mV can be handled by the TMV. The cells with lower mismatch are not TMV-
correctable and become the target of our burn-in efforts. The worst-case threshold voltage
shift, when the maximum error rate is 50%, for the burn-in process is set at a higher value
than 19mV to account for the approximations made in our analysis. This value becomes the
total target mismatch required to create a fully reliable PUF system. We also note that an
error rate of 50% would represent the ideal true random number generator (TRNG). Based
on the observed maximum error, which represents the lowest mismatch observed among
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Figure 4.6: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch
the PUF cells of a particular IC, we can calculate the threshold voltage shift required from
the burn-in process to reach the target mismatch. In a real-world scenario, the maximum
observed error rates are likely to be below 50%, and hence, the needed threshold voltage
shift from burn-in will be less than the set target value. This reduced threshold voltage shift
translates into significant savings with regards to burn-in time.
4.4 Burn-in time reduction
In this section, we explore the advantage of using the proposed solution presented in
Section 4.3 considering Weak PUF systems that need to generate 128 reliable bits. The
reported results consider a cumulative burn-in time, where we assume that only a single IC
undergoes the accelerated aging at a time. In practical situations, different manufacturers
can utilize different ways. Hence, it is difficult to assume just one arbitrary process.
4.4.1 Weak PUF Designs
Along with the simple SRAM-like Weak PUF design (Ref ), we extend the analysis
using other PUF designs proposed in our earlier work [166]. It was shown that connecting
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PMOS NMOS λ1 λ2
Cells with 0
error (%)
Simple (Ref ) 90 nm 90 nm 0.292 1.906 83
Two Parallel Loads (D1) 180 nm 90 nm 0.188 2.395 96
Current Mirror Load (D2) 180 nm 90 nm 0.191 2.491 97
FinFET (F1) 1 fin 1 fin 0.413 1.595 60
either the pull-up or pull-down transistors of the cross-coupled inverters in the PUF to
a bias voltage can significantly benefit reliability. Since we consider NBTI as the aging
mechanism of interest for the burn-in process, we modify the circuits so that the pull-down
transistors are connected to bias voltages while the pull-up transistors are cross-coupled
to form the inverters. For this work, we choose the parallel active loads design with two
parallel NMOS transistors (D1 ), as shown in Figure 4.7, and the current mirror-based design
with NMOS current mirrors (D2 ), as shown in Figure 4.8. The access transistors and the
pre-charge voltages connected to OUT and OUT are the same as the Ref design, shown
in Figure 4.5, and are omitted in the circuit diagrams for clarity. The transistors are sized
to allow maximum process variation sensitivity except for the footer (M2), which is sized
larger to allow the circuit’s proper operation. Vbias was set to 0.5V for D1 and 0V for D2.
Conventional CMOS scaling beyond the 45nm technology node is severely constrained by
pronounced threshold voltage (Vth) fluctuations resulting from Short Channel Effects (SCE)
and Random Dopant Fluctuations (RDF) due to process variations [71,180,198,207]. Hence,
FinFETs were developed to facilitate the continued scaling of technology nodes. FinFET
devices exhibit better electrostatic characteristics with respect to SCE as the gate, or fin,
wraps around a thin slice of silicon (channel) [177]. The greater control over the channel
allows FinFETs to have lower leakage current and power consumption over bulk CMOS. We
wished to study the effect on burn-in requirements when using FinFETs as the basis for
constructing the Weak PUF. We considered only the Ref design, as shown in Figure 4.5,
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Figure 4.7: Modified parallel active loads-based PUF design (D1 ) [166]
Figure 4.8: Modified current mirror-based PUF design (D2 ) [166]
and instantiated the PUF, termed as F1, using 20 nm FinFETs using predictive technology
models [19]. We fixed the fin number at 1 for all transistors except the footer (M7 in
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Ref ), which had 2 fins for proper current sinking. We set the supply voltage at 0.9V. The
specifications for the various designs are tabulated in Table 4.1.
4.4.2 Thermal Noise Errors
The random motion of the charge carriers from thermal excitation induces thermal noise
in transistors and can create random voltage fluctuations in conductors [120,160]. Thermal
noise has a near-uniform power spectral density, and there is no correlation among differ-
ent samples across time. Short channel effects [87] can exacerbate the effects of thermal
noise in advanced CMOS technology nodes, causing a significant impact on transistor noise
performance [205]. The thermal noise at any given node can be represented with a normal






where kB is the Boltzmann constant, T is the absolute temperature (Kelvin), and C is the
node capacitance (Farads).
We record the node capacitances at OUT and OUT in each design (Ref, D1, D2, F1 ),
under no process variation condition, to determine the amount of thermal noise to be added
to Vdd,1 and Vdd,2.
4.4.3 Error Rate vs Mismatch
Using the procedure described in section 4.3.2, we seek to find the correlation proxies for
each of the designs being considered. For the planar MOSFETs (Ref, D1, D2 ), we utilized
the 45 nm technology [18] to instantiate the cells. The supply voltage (Vdd) is set to 1V.
We shift the threshold voltage of one of the PMOS transistors (M3) in steps of 1mV up
to a maximum of 150mV. This threshold voltage sweep represents the proxy for the total
mismatch and helps simplify further analysis. At each step, we perform 2000 evaluations of
the cell under varying thermal noise conditions, using (4.3), and calculate the error rates.
Figure 4.9 shows the results which highlight the fact that the alternate designs (D1 and D2 )
have a greater process sensitivity than Ref as every step increase in mismatch reduces the
observed error significantly and the error rate reaches 0 % with a lower amount of mismatch.
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Figure 4.9: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch for alternate
Weak PUF designs ({D1,D2}) based on [166]
In cases where incorporating the alternate designs may not be desired, we sought to
explore a technique to improve the performance of the existing SRAM-based PUF (Ref ).
Boosting the supply voltage is beneficial for the operation of an SRAM [169]. However, we
must also be aware of an increase in leakage power. For this work, we study the performance
of Ref when the supply voltage is boosted to 1.2V. As shown in Figure 4.10, the results
indicate a decrease in the error rate with increased mismatch under higher supply voltage.
A designer can generate any number of such proxies at different voltages and use the data
to adaptively choose what supply voltage needs to be set for the PUF block, which decides
the burn-in time. This is because we only output the maximum error rate from an IC that
is later used with the correlation data. However, such supply adaptability increases the
complexity of the overall system design.
Replacing the planar MOSFET based PUF (Ref ) with FinFET-based design (F1 ) pro-
vides better performance in cases where the inherent mismatch is higher, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.11. We note here that the FinFETs are more susceptible to thermal noise (from (4.3))
as the node capacitances are lower due to the smaller technology node (20 nm) compared to
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Figure 4.10: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch for Ref under
nominal and boosted supply voltage (1.2V)
the planar MOSFET. The results show that FinFET based implementations can be viable
as Weak PUFs even with the higher noise.
4.4.4 Modeling Process Variation
4.4.4.1 Planar MOSFET
Manufacturing induced process variations are modeled as random parametric variations
in the threshold voltage (V TH) and channel length (L) of each transistor in a circuit. The
values are obtained from a normal distribution, N(µ, σ2), where the mean (µ) and standard
deviation (σ) are determined based on the technology node used. Transistor geometry
impacts the susceptibility of a device to process variations, with larger devices experiencing
fewer fluctuations. In terms of threshold voltage, the mean is the default transistor model







Figure 4.11: Error rate correlation with PUF cell threshold voltage mismatch for planar
MOSFET (Ref ) and FinFET (F1 ) designs
where (Wmin,Lmin) are the minimum possible width and length of a device, respectively,
and (W ,L) are the sizes used in the design. σV TH0 is the standard deviation of threshold
voltage for the minimum sized device.
In this work, we instantiate the planar MOSFET PUF cell designs (Ref, D1, D2 ) with
45 nm NCSU FreePDK45 models [18]. Typically, for 45 nm node, a standard deviation of
53mV for threshold voltage and 10 % channel length variation are considered [16]. We used
equation (4.4) to calculate the standard deviation for threshold voltage of any arbitrary
sized transistor.
4.4.4.2 FinFET
While FinFETs are not affected by RDF due to undoped channel, they are susceptible
to Work Function Variation (WFV) caused by irregularities in fin surface from the manu-
facturing process [149]. Hence, WFV has the most significant impact on threshold voltage
variation. For this work, we consider a standard deviation of 30mV for threshold voltage to
represent the process variation in FinFET transistors [149].
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4.4.5 Heterogeneous Error Model
In realistic scenarios, a collection of Weak PUF cells would have a distribution of errors.
This heterogeneous error model is advantageous in modeling real PUF systems as a homo-
geneous error model can overestimate the required ECC resources [141]. The homogeneous
model would also provide no useful information for driving the burn-in process as all cells
would be assumed to have the same error rate and, hence, the same process mismatch.
For this work, 10, 000 instances of the PUF cell, for each design, were simulated with
the relevant process variation parameters, as described in sections 4.4.4. Each cell was eval-
uated 1000 times under varying thermal noise (as determined in section 4.4.2) at 25 °C. We
obtained the error rate by comparing it with a simulation with no noise. Utilizing the result-
ing data with the mathematical framework for the heterogeneous error model [141], we can
generate error rates for an arbitrary number of PUF cells for each given design. The relevant
2-parameter model details for each PUF design are tabulated in Table 4.1. We also list the
percentage of cells among an arbitrary population that would possess 0% error for each
design, given the 2-parameter model data. Due to the higher thermal noise susceptibility,
FinFET implementation (F1 ) offers the lowest amount of 60%. This observation indicates
that the FinFET based design will offer fewer savings than a comparable planar MOSFET
design in terms of total burn-in time.
4.4.6 Cumulative Burn-in Time
Since we targeted to obtain 128 stable bits from a PUF system, we first considered the
system had 128 initial PUF cells, and all the cells needed to be reliable. Next, we considered
a scenario where a 2% yield loss might be acceptable, and masking is used. For this case,
we reused (4.1) with {k = 128, p = 0.98} to find the value of N that would result in
Pe(N) ≤ 10−6 (failure rate of 1 ppm). Results showed that we needed 144 initial PUF cells.
For all the designs considered in this paper (Ref, D1, D2, F1 ), we assume that the
burn-in temperature is 100 °C and the stress voltage is 1.1V and utilize (4.2.4) to calculate
the time required. The relevant device parameters for the NBTI equation are obtained from










































































































































































































































































For obtaining the cumulative burn-in time, 1million PUF systems were generated for
the 128 and 144 cells/system cases for each Weak PUF design using the heterogeneous
error model. For each PUF system, the threshold voltage mismatch was found using the
methodology described in section 4.3. To find a necessary increase in device mismatch in
each system, the data from section 4.4.3 and the mismatch representing the 6% error rate
(for 4-bit TMV) were used. Our target threshold voltage shift (also the worst-case shift)
was set by increasing the TMV mismatch found for each design by 30%. This is to account
for the approximations in our methodology for correlating error rate and inherent mismatch.
Table 4.2 also lists the amount of time needed to increase the PMOS threshold voltage due
to NBTI by the target mismatch value.
For each system, the max error rate indicates the lowest amount of inherent mismatch
and decides the threshold voltage shift needed to reach the target. The shift needed is used in
(4.2.4) to calculate the burn-in time. The cumulative burn-in time (Optimized) for 1million
PUF systems with 128 and 144 initial cells are recorded in Table 4.2 for each design. We
also note that a manufacturer might need to assume that each IC needs to undergo the
maximum burn-in for each design without the proposed solution.
From the results, in Table 4.2, we see that intelligent burn-in offers significant savings
compared to a constant worst-case scenario-driven burn-in. Also, using extra bits (144)
and masking results in reduced burn-in time compared to using just 128 cells/system. D2
offers the best results for any PUF system as the burn-in required is negligible compared to
other designs. Additionally, combining the alternate designs (D1 and D2 ) with masking and
extra bits can allow us to forgo burn-in entirely. Consequently, these designs are attractive
for low-cost applications where dedicated PUF circuits would make more sense regarding
resource utilization. The FinFET (F1 ) results show that we need to use extra bits for
greater reliability, but the lower cell area for the technology allows us to incorporate more
cells easily.
The results discussed here show the relative performance of various designs, but are
ultimately dependent on the amount of error correction afforded to us by the TMVs used
during regular operation. Vijayakumar et al. have shown that using an Up-Down counter
[213] allows them to correct twice the error compared to a similarly sized regular TMV. In
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actual designs, using better error correction reduces the target mismatch required by the
burn-in process, but a designer must weigh such considerations against various constraints
such as available area, power requirements, and so on.
Resource Overheads: We considered a 144-PUFs system and calculated the area overhead
from the Burn-in Optimizer, Central Control, Mask Array and 10-bit counter described in
section 4.3. The rest of the circuitry for TMV-based reliable bit generation is assumed to
be present in the system. Using the 45 nm standard cell library from Nangate [17], the area
overhead was found to be 500µm2 (Burn-in optimizer costs 149µm2). This area is a small
overhead as most of the area (≈ 2500µm2) for an efficient implementation is occupied by
the TMV counters, PUF cells, and the mux arrays.
The primary testing time overhead is from obtaining the maximum error rate, which
entails serially querying each PUF cell 1024 times (10-bit counter) and processing the results.
For a 144-PUFs system, this requires ∼ 150, 000 cycles in total. At a test frequency of
10MHz, for example, each chip will need 15ms to generate the results. However, in cases
where no burn-in is required, the designer can directly proceed to the final key enrollment
phase. The Burn-in Optimizer is only used to set the Mask Array, and the system operates
at its final intended frequency, which is greater than the test frequency.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Literature works have extensively proposed Weak PUFs for security applications such
as key/ID generation. Such applications require the PUFs to be highly reliable even in the
presence of noise. To ameliorate the noise susceptibility of the PUF outputs, many different
techniques have been proposed. One such method is to utilize burn-in/accelerated aging for
improving PUF reliability. Our work focuses on creating a PUF system that enables the
calculation of minimum burn-in time for an IC. We obtain results for various SRAM-like
Weak PUF designs, which show a significant reduction in burn-in times, providing large
savings during the manufacturing process’s post-silicon stages. Further, results show that




PMU-TROJAN: ON EXPLOITING POWER MANAGEMENT SIDE
CHANNEL FOR INFORMATION LEAKAGE
5.1 Introduction
In a blockchain network, any entity connected to other entities in a peer-to-peer manner
is called a client. All these clients talk to each other and form a network where each client
works as a node. Nodes are responsible for verifying and relaying the transactions and
blocks on the network [157]. The nodes which download and verify every single block, and
therefore every single transaction in each block, are referred to as full nodes. A full node
requires time and resources, as the download and validation process is particularly heavy
on CPU and disk IO. For example, it is recommended that a full node requires a computer
with multi-core CPU, 4GB RAM, and an SSD drive, and at least 200GB free space [26].
Running a full node is the most secure way to interact with the blockchain, making this
piece of infrastructure critical to the network. Organizations or individuals run full nodes
if they need it for their business. The Miners run full nodes as they get rewards for mining
coins in Bitcoin or transaction fees in Ethereum. However, running a full node requires an
adequate level of knowledge and resources that most users are understandably unwilling to
invest in. As e result, there is no built-in incentive for individual users to run a full node.
Consequently, individual users resort to a third-party centralized infrastructure as an al-
ternative to running full nodes. For example, the most popular software wallets (Metamask,
MyEtherWallet, MyCrypto, Jaxx, Exodus, etc.) rely on third-party hosted nodes. These
clients connect to a remote node and completely trust their responses. The positive aspect
of this is an enhanced user experience as these wallets’ users do not need to run their nodes.
However, significant security threats may arise when users are forced to trust a third party
infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) while handling sensitive data such as private keys.
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Such Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud computing supports multiple virtual ma-
chines on a hardware platform managed by a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or hypervisor.
These co-resident VMs are mutually distrusting, and a malicious VM can pose risks to the
confidentiality and integrity of the co-resident VMs. This chapter proposes a method where
a co-tenant thread monitors the power management side-channel information from a thread
affected by a hardware Trojan. Such a Trojan can leak secret private keys and disrupt digital
transactions.
The globalization of semiconductor manufacturing and the phenomenal growth of tran-
sistor devices are posing new threats for secure and reliable hardware design. The business
model of outsourcing design and fabrication to increase profitability gives an adversary
enough scope to tamper the supply chain by inserting hidden, malicious logic, known as
Hardware Trojan, into an IC [45]. Hardware Trojan creates a malicious backdoor that can
allow an attacker to disable a chip’s security, access secret keys, reprogram cryptographic
part, access unencrypted configuration bitstream, modify low-level silicon features, or per-
manently destroy the device [137].
Several emerging trends in hardware integration and user computing practices are cre-
ating ample scope of such malicious back-doors. Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scal-
ing (DVFS) is an intelligent power-management technique that enables frequency scaling-
capable processors to change the frequency and voltage of a processor(s) based on system per-
formance requirements [134]. It is a commonly-used technique to save power on a wide range
of computing systems, from embedded, laptop, and desktop systems to high-performance
server-class systems.
Power Management Unit (PMU) (Power Management Integrated Circuit or PMIC) is a
system block for managing DVFS and other power requirements in an SoC device. PMUs
offer various services ranging from DVFS, managing power states to dynamic control of power
rails. They are the most extensive and fastest-growing part of the analog IC market [4,22].
They provide flexible power management and increase energy efficiency in high-performance
Multiprocessor System-on-Chips (MPSoCs) [195]. The control over the change of voltage and
frequency level by PMUs can create a backdoor for malicious attack. Triggering the voltage
level change by a hardware Trojan according to the extracted secret key and monitoring the
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change level, the secret key can be leaked covertly to an adversary. This chapter proposes
PMU-Trojan, a hardware Trojan that exploits the PMU side channel for secret information
leakage. This method is easily generalizable to any information leakage. For demonstration
purposes, we focus on leaking the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key.
The proposed method is particularly useful in data center scenarios where the data
center is far away and needs remote maintenance. There are two options for maintaining
servers remotely: (i) Integrated management card, (ii) Power Distribution Unit (PDU).
While a PDU manages the power supply only, a management interface card allows much
more maintenance options for the server. Remote management cards allow administrators
to troubleshoot from afar via an interface to the server. Examples of integrated management
cards are HPE iLO (Integrated Lights-Out), Dell iDRAC (Integrated Dell Remote Access
Card), IBM RSA (Remote Supervisor Adaptor), Lenovo’s ThinkServer EasyManage, etc.
These are autonomous management systems built into the server, which offer the remote
administrator simplifying server setup, power and thermal optimization, and server health
monitoring. As an example scenario, in this work, we demonstrated how a remote admin-
istrator could monitor the Trojan infected voltage level change and obtain the secret key
using our proposed methodology.
The major contributions of this chapter are:
• Designing a PMU-Trojan to extract and then leak secret key covertly to an adversary.
• Applying the proposed secret key leakage method in a data center application.
• Proposing a Trojan detection method to prevent the secret key leakage.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the related works in leaking
secret cryptographic keys, mainly the AES key. Section 5.3 briefly presents backgrounds
related to our proposed methodology for leaking the AES key. In Section 5.4, we present
PMU-Trojan and our proposed methodology to leak AES key using the Trojan. Section
5.5 discusses experimental results and analysis of the proposed method. In section 5.6, the




Several literature works have proposed various methods to leak cryptographic secrets,
mainly AES key, from the chip. Physical attacks which target leaking the cryptographic
secrets are classified as observation and perturbation attacks.
Observation or Side-Channel Attack (SCA) consists of observing physical emanations of
the system, such as, power [125] or E/H field [172]. Skorobogatov et al. proposed a method
of extracting the secret key to activate the backdoor and other security keys such as the
AES and the Passkey by using Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA) [192].
Perturbation or Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) consists of injecting faults during the
execution of a cryptographic algorithm [49]. Piret et al. proposed a technique to break
the AES-128 with only two faulty ciphertexts, assuming the fault occurs between the an-
tepenultimate and the penultimate MixColumn [170]. Bhasin et al. proposed a hardware
Trojan whose principle is to trigger an artificial fault injection to reveal Advanced Encryption
Engine (AES) secret key. [44]. Kumaki et al. proposed a cipher-destroying and secret-key-
emitting hardware Trojan by developing a malicious circuit that connects the encryption
and decryption modules in the AES core. [129]
Liu et al. presented a silicon implementation of a hardware Trojan, which is capable of
leaking the secret key of a wireless cryptographic integrated circuit (IC) consisting of an
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core and an Ultra-WideBand (UWB) transmitter
[138]. Giraud et al. presented two fault attacks on the AES: inducing a fault on only one bit
of an intermediate result and exploiting faults on bytes. Both require the ability to obtain
several faulty ciphertexts originating from the same plaintext [85]. Dusart et al. exploited
the byte faults occurring after the ShiftRow layer of the 9th round to find AES key [74].
Mayer proposed a side-channeling attack to extract the private key successfully exploiting
the SEC (Standards for Efficient Cryptography) Group’s curve secp256k1, which is currently
used in Bitcoin and Ethereum [151]. Prior information leakage techniques mainly rely on
the side-channel analysis or fault injection, subject to noise effects, and the challenge of
building an accurate fault model. However, there have been very few works that can leak
secret information using hardware Trojan. Our work provides an alternative approach to
leaking information using hardware Trojan.
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Figure 5.1: Minimalistic hardware Trojan example.
5.3 Background
This section explores some relevant background regarding hardware Trojans, Dynamic
Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS), Power Management Unit (PMU), and remote server
maintenance.
5.3.1 Hardware Trojans
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications implanted in an IC, which can be exploited
by a knowledgeable adversary to compromise a chip’s security. Trojan circuits, by design,
are typically activated under particular conditions (e.g., sensing a specific design signal such
as power or temperature, connecting to low-transition probability nets), which makes them
unlikely to be activated and detected using random or functional stimuli. A hardware Trojan
consists of the following two main components.
• Trigger: used for activating a malicious activity.
• Payload: used for executing the malicious activity.
Figure 5.1 shows an archetype hardware Trojan. In this minimalistic Trojan, the trigger
part is a simple logic-AND gate. When both the inputs A and B are equal to logic-1,
the Trojan circuit is activated. The payload part is a logic-XOR gate. When the Trojan
is activated, it inverts the intermediate node C. An adversary can design such hardware
Trojan to access secret keys, disable or destroy a system at an opportunistic time.
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Figure 5.2: Block diagram of MPSoC embedded with PMU [81].
5.3.2 Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS)
With higher integration of transistor devices and exponentially increasing demands for
processing power and clock-rates, power consumption and thermal performance of integrated
circuits have become a limiting factor for modern processor systems. An optimizing power
supply solution is required for power-saving benefits and reducing the self-heating of a pro-
cessor chip. Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is a method of changing the
frequency and operating voltage of a processor(s) based on system performance requirements
at a given point in time. DVFS allows operating systems to change operating performance
points in real-time without any kernel or user involvement to achieve the lowest power and
best performance possible.
In CMOS circuits, most of the dynamic power is consumed in the parasitic capacitance
of digital gates. If the dynamic behavior is adjusted to fit the task being executed, a
considerable amount of power can be saved. The equation for dynamic power is:
PT = Cpd × V 2cc × fI ×NSW
where, PT is the transient power consumption, Cpd is dynamic power dissipation capacitance,
Vcc is supply voltage, fI is input frequency, and NSW is number of input bits switching. An
intelligent power savings solution reduces operating frequency and simultaneously reduces
the supply voltage. Few examples of commercial implementations of DVFS technique are
AMD’s PowerNow and Intel’s SpeedStep.
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5.3.3 Power Management Unit (PMU)
DVFS has been realized at both hardware and operating system levels. A Power Man-
agement Integrated Unit (PMU) is a system block for managing DVFS and other power
requirements in an SoC device [201]. Figure 5.2 illustrates a block diagram of an MPSoC
along with an exemplary PMU.
A PMU is configured to transmit a voltage change request to a Voltage Regulator (VR)
unit based on the decision made by the DVFS algorithm. For example, Intel processors use
a Serial Voltage IDentification (SVID) three-wire (clock, data, alert) synchronous interface
to transfer the voltage change requests to VR, which in turn decodes the VID and supplies
the corresponding voltage to the processor through the power rails. Specifically, Intel i7-
4650 processor line allows 8-bit VID Data signal (00h-FFh) to request for a voltage ranging
between 0V to 3.04V, although the specified operating voltage ranges between 1.64V to
1.85V [14].
An associated monitor circuit is configured to determine whether the requested voltage
change has occurred. The monitor circuit detects the voltage change by monitoring the
frequency of a VCO (Voltage-Controlled Oscillator) within the monitor circuit coupled to
the voltage source. Upon receiving the voltage transition complete signal, the PMU adjusts
the processing core’s clock frequency within the integrated circuit. PMU supplies each
component on an SoC with just enough voltage to deliver the required performance while
minimizing power consumption.
5.3.4 Remote Server Maintenance: Integrated Management Card
Today’s data centers and server rooms are challenging environments to control and man-
age. They require 24x7 monitoring of server health and other well-being checks remotely.
Since data center security policies are typically complicated, urgent remote server main-
tenance needs an intelligent solution. Integrated Management Card is a hardware-based
management platform that allows administrators to remotely check, configure or reset sys-
tems remotely through an interface.
The interface can be simple and Web-based, or a program run on a local computer.
Administrators can perform a wide range of operations using the interface menu, such as
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monitoring the server’s current state, remote rebooting, performing a power cycle from a
distance, or opening a console session to work remotely on the server. Management card
provides an array of practical, hardware-level information about a system, including operat-
ing frequency, voltage levels, power-supply status, fan speeds, temperatures, etc. Examples
of integrated management cards are HPE iLO, Dell iDRAC, IBM RSA, Lenovo ThinkServer
EasyManage, etc.
5.4 Proposed Methodology
In this section, we first describe a threat model and then present our proposed method-
ology for leaking AES key by inserting Trojan and exploiting PMU behavior [105].
5.4.1 Threat Model
Hardware Trojan can be inserted in a chip at various stages from the Register Transfer
Level (RTL) code to mask fabrication. An attacker can introduce Trojan by modifying
the netlist design or lithographic masks. For an illustrative example, in our work to leak
AES key, such modifications can be done by a few key hardware engineers who can insert a
malicious circuit during the design phase without affecting the design’s main functionality
[214, 219]. At any stage, from designing RTL code to lithographic mask, the soft product
design provider can include hidden, malicious functionality that can be turned on at an
opportunistic time. The adversary can then leverage such malicious modifications for leaking
confidential information, such as a secret cryptographic key.
5.4.2 Trojan Insertion
Figure 5.3 shows an MPSoC block diagram implanted with PMU-Trojan to extract the
AES key. The trigger part of the Trojan is a checker circuit that checks for a specific
sequence of three 8-bit VID data signals coming out of PMU. When the specific sequence
is matched, it activates the Trojan payload. The payload circuit consists of a PMU-Trojan
key-extractor and a Multiplexer.
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Figure 5.3: MPSoC infected with hardware Trojan.
5.4.3 Trojan Activation
We propose a software-hardware coalition-based trigger that takes advantage of the core
processor’s voltage change requests. Similar to the sequence cheat code idea presented by
Waksman et al. [214], we propose a sequence of power event requests for triggering the un-
derlying Trojan. Several OSes deploy some form of DVFS at the operating system level.
For example, Linux implements CPUfreq, a standard kernel framework to switch between
various frequencies and operating voltages. CPUfreq monitors the system performance re-
quirements of a processor(s) and takes decisions to increase or decrease operating frequency
in order to serve the user’s needs and save power [6].
The rules for adjusting frequencies, whether to a faster or slower clock speed and when
to adjust frequencies, are defined by the CPUfreq governor. The governor defines the power
characteristics of CPU, which in turn affects CPU system performance. There are several
implementations of CPUfreq governor: (i) performance, and (ii) powersave, (iii) ondemand,
(iv) conservative, (v) userspace, etc.
The userspace governor is a customizable governor that allows the user program (or any
process running as root) to decide the processor’s specific speed. For triggering PMU-Trojan,
a program is written to change the frequency in a particular sequence. When the program
runs, the frequency of the processor changes accordingly.
The OS looks-up in the Operating Performance Point (OPP) Library to find the corre-
sponding voltage levels. OPP is the set of discrete tuples consisting of frequency and voltage
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Figure 5.4: Flow chart illustrating the proposed methodology.
pairs that the device supports. OPP library provides a set of helper functions to organize
and query the OPP information [210]. The PMU sends the voltage change requests in the
form of VID signals to the Voltage Regulator (VR). The checker circuit monitors the incom-
ing requests for the complex sequence. When the sequence matches, it selects the AES key
extracted by the Trojan. Thus the PMU changes the voltage levels according to the AES
key instead of changing according to OPP.
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Figure 5.5: An example attack scenario at data center.
5.4.4 Trojan Operation
Once the Trojan is triggered, the processor core voltage changes according to the ex-
tracted AES key. An adversary monitors the voltage level change and obtains the key
covertly. The Serial VID corresponding to a voltage level is processor-specific and can be
obtained from the processor manufacturer’s datasheet. There are several hardware monitor-
ing tools, such as, Intel Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU), Intel Performance Counter
Monitor (PCM), Intel Extreme Tuning Utility [15], HWMonitor, CPU-Z [5] for Windows op-
erating system and i7z, c2ctl for Linux operating system [3]. The methodology is illustrated
as a flowchart in Figure 5.4.
In the data center scenario, an adversary can monitor the PMU-Trojan induced voltage
level change using the Integrated Management Card. Figure 5.5 illustrates such a case,
where a Threat Actor can sneak information using IBM RSA management card. A Threat
Actor could be anyone with a malicious agenda, such as a rogue Administrator, outside agent,
third party vendor, that has gained access to the server network. Apart from administrators,
malicious attacks can also be initiated by compromised third party Business Partner if a
credentialed account in the Business Partner network is allowed to access servers in the core
data center [23].
87
Table 5.1: Frequency and voltage level change
Frequency (GHz) FID Voltage (V) VID
3.1 8 1.2 32
2.7 7 1.150 28
2.3 6 1.125 26
5.5 Experimental Results
We implemented the Trojan blocks in Verilog RTL and synthesized the RTL with Nan-
gate 45nm Open Cell Library [101] using Synopsys Design Compiler to find the Trojan
design overheads. The Trojan incurs an area overhead of 192µm2. The power overhead is
negligible, as PMU-Trojan has a low activity factor. For coarse-grain DVFS with an off-chip
voltage regulator, voltage level stabilization takes around 50µs [196]. For fine-grain DVFS
with a fully integrated on-die voltage regulator, such as Intel Haswell processor, a voltage
change can be done once in 500ns [53]. Compared to core frequency, the rate at which
voltage can be changed is 2-3 orders of magnitude slower. This results in a low activity
factor for the PMU-Trojan, hence low power dissipation overhead.
For testing the frequency and voltage level change in terms of FID (Frequency Identifi-
cation Number) and VID, respectively, we ran a program in a Q9450 Core 2 Quad Processor
workstation and monitored the FID and VID signals change using c2ctl tool. c2ctl is a fre-
quency and voltage monitoring performance utility tool. Appendix B shows a sample code
snippet for triggering PMU-Trojan. The imposed frequency change at a specific sequence
and the observed voltage level change are shown in Table 5.1. This experiment is just an
example of a change of VID signals according to a specific frequency level change. A Trojan
infected chip will change the VID signals according to the AES key similarly.
5.6 Trojan Detection
This section describes the complexity of PMU-Trojan activation during the pre-deployment
test and the limitations of traditional Trojan detection methods. We then propose a low
complexity technique to detect anomalous behavior inflicted by PMU-Trojan.
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Our proposed method increases the magnitude of complexity involved in Trojan detec-
tion by a statistical approach during testing [57]. VID signals are 6 to 8 bits in modern
processors. A sequence of voltage change requests in the form of VID signals can thus po-
tentially have enormous state space resulting in enormous test times. Therefore, activating
the Trojan during post-silicon tests has an extremely low probability. Our proposed scheme
also defeats traditional Differential Power Analysis (DPA) based Trojan detection due to
a low information bit rate spread over a long time by a PMU-Trojan. Hardware Trojan
detection technique, like information flow tracking [80] tags assets such as cryptographic
key bits in the design, then use formal methods such as model checking [174] and theorem
proving [119] to analyze how these bits propagate through the design. However, we leak the
secret information via a side-channel by monitoring the voltage level change in our proposed
work. This information flow via side-channel does not depend on the conditions under which
information can safely flow between specific signals in a design.
For detecting PMU-Trojan, a concurrent hardware monitoring thread is written, which
continuously checks the voltage level change according to the AES key. If any such event
occurs, the monitoring thread will alarm and shut down the system immediately.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we outline a novel security threat stemming from a hardware Trojan
that can intelligently impact the behavior of PMU. We designed PMU-Trojan that can leak
confidential information by exploiting the PMU behavior. The proposed Trojan incurs a
very marginal area overhead and can be triggered by executing a simple program. The
threat is ominous, particularly in the data-center application where a malicious adversary




REMOTE CONFIGURATION OF INTEGRATED CIRCUIT
FEATURES VIA SMART CONTRACTS
6.1 Introduction
CMOS technology has been a driver of growth in the semiconductor industry for over
three decades with rapid scaling of transistor feature size. With scaling, the cost of devel-
oping a new integrated circuit (IC), its manufacture, debugging and volume production has
increased. The cost of developing a new SoC, its debug and design iterations is escalating
with the transition to 7nm technology and beyond. The semiconductor industry’s economic
model is typically based on economies of scale, and this model works well for high-volume
products, such as smartphones. However, the volume for any single chip is insufficient for
smaller, more fragmented markets to justify the high level of investment needed — partic-
ularly for advanced process nodes such as FinFET, for example [78].
Consequently, without the ability to customize IC features after production, an IC’s
lowest-priced application determines its price. This challenge motivates the manufacturers
to develop capabilities for post-production IC customization. Today, such customization is
limited to one-time programmable (OTP) for predetermined IC bins [38, 68]. This chapter
explores how an IC can be programmed repeatedly and securely using blockchain-based
smart contracts. This programmability will enable users to upgrade IC features or rent
upgraded IC features for a fixed period after users have purchased the IC.
The manufacturer can implement the IC feature configuration based on a centralized
architecture [73]. Information is sent from the device to the cloud, where the data is pro-
cessed using analytics and then sent back to the device. Figure 6.1 shows an example of this
centralized system-based remote feature configuration, a smart device automatically paying
for its feature configuration upgrade. Such a system encounters four technical challenges
that human-centric applications solve with a person in the loop.
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Figure 6.1: An example application that stores a user’s credit card information is installed
in the user’s device and vendor repository. Before upgrading the chip configuration, the
device and the vendor repository identify each other. Then, the credit card stored by the
cloud service is charged after the user upgrades the device configuration.
The first challenge is transparency. In Figure 6.1, the smart device automatically per-
forms actions on a user’s behalf. As the device sends encrypted data to the cloud service,
it would be impossible for the user to audit the encrypted information to ensure that the
device did not send any private data — a concern that is well justified [34,161].
The second challenge is longevity. Some of these devices may still be in use long after
their vendors stop maintaining them [92]. However, these devices are often vertical silos,
where a centralized entity manages application state and communication protocols. As a
result these devices cannot function without the cloud services of their vendors [82, 95]. In
Figure 6.1, the device cannot pay to the vendor without the cloud service.
The third challenge is trust. In Figure 6.1, the user has to trust the vendor with their
credit card information, and the credit card company acts as a trusted third party to help
manage funds and resolve disputes in exchange for non-negligible fees. Transactions that
involve the exchange of digital or physical assets require trust, which inherently involves
risks. Examples of such risks are the vendor leaking credit card information or the credit
card company undermining exchange’s fairness by colluding while resolving disputes [86].
The fourth challenge is a single point of failure. Figure 6.1 presents a client-server model
for configuration update distribution from the vendor’s repository to the user device. In this
model, excessive network traffic may occur when devices request the update files simulta-
neously. In the IoT environment where tens of millions of devices are possibly required to
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be updated simultaneously, this type of centralized client-server model is inappropriate, has
very limited scalability, and exposes billions of weak points that may compromise network
security.
Each of these challenges can compromise the centralized system based remote device
feature configuration. Using blockchain technology is one approach to addressing these
challenges. A blockchain guarantees complete transparency of transactions carried out on
the chain. Besides, it allows the state to be stored among the nodes in a decentralized
network that persists as long as the network of nodes exists. Moreover, independent and
autonomous execution of the smart contract logic by each node on the network using the
blockchain’s data reduces the need for trust and third party involvement in a transaction
[108].
In this work, we propose blockchain-based smart contracts for enabling chip features on-
field. The smart contract takes the user’s feature configuration request as input and returns
an encrypted configuration. To support the manufacturer’s authorized feature configuration,
we propose an on-die hardware module that enforces the hardware configuration’s secure
execution. The major contributions of this work are:
• Proposing a protocol for remote, secure, and repeated configuration of IC features via
smart contracts.
• Proposing smart contracts which define the protocol and stores the state and logic
necessary for remote chip feature upgrades.
• Proposing an on-die hardware module that communicates with the smart contract and
enforces its functionalities.
• Demonstrating the proposed solution in both software and hardware implementation.
The implementation is publicly available [20].
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the related works on blockchain-
based firmware upgrade. Section 6.3 presents the motivation behind blockchain-based remote
IC configuration. Section 6.4 presents the system design and implemented smart contracts
for our proposed protocol. In Section 6.5, we present our proposed hardware design and
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the methodology to chip feature upgrade using blockchain. Section 6.8 discusses the secu-
rity analysis of the proposed protocol. In Section 6.6, we outline the implementation and
demonstration of the protocol. Section 6.7 presents the results, evaluation and Section 6.9
discusses the limitations of this approach. Finally, Section 6.10 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Related Works
Although several blockchain-based firmware update protocols have been proposed in the
literature [39, 51, 135], there have been very few works on upgrading the hardware config-
uration via blockchain. A peer-to-peer framework was proposed by Boudguiga et al. to
disseminate firmware updates between IoT devices that have restricted Internet access [51].
They investigated how the use of a blockchain framework would meet the requirements of
the CIA triad properties, i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability. Lee et al. proposed a
blockchain-based firmware update scheme, where an embedded device requests its firmware
update to nodes in a blockchain network and gets a response to determine whether its
firmware is up-to-date or not [135]. If not latest, the embedded device downloads the latest
firmware from a peer-to-peer firmware sharing network of the nodes. Baza et al. proposed
a firmware update scheme based on blockchain and smart contract for autonomous vehicles
[39]. The smart contract ensures the authenticity and integrity of firmware updates, and
manages the reputation values of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) that transfer the new updates
to other AVs.
6.3 Motivation
In this section, we present our motivation for post-production IC customization and the
smart contract based solution for such customization.
6.3.1 Motivation for Post-production IC Customization
Without the ability to customize chip configuration after production, the price of an
IC is determined by its lowest priced application. Chip manufacturers sell the highest end
chips as lesser chip parts based on consumer demand. This motivates the manufacturers to
develop capabilities for post-production IC customization.
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Realizing Economies of Scale Several semiconductor industries apply chip config-
uration after manufacturing. The commodity microprocessor business offers an example of
post-production customization, where a manufacturer can tailor the number of cores, cache
size, and frequency of operation for a target market segment after manufacturing a chip [194].
The Intel Skylake micro-architecture, for instance, features a highly configurable design. In-
tel can meet the various market segment requirements using the same macro cells [147].
The Skylake family consists of five separate actual dies which can be further segmented by
disabling various features. For example, GT1 graphics are based on GT2 graphics that have
disabled half the execution units [21]. However, such customization techniques are limited
to one-time programmable (OTP) for predetermined IC bins presently.
Customizing Feature Upgrades The availability of a post-production customiza-
tion technique could, for example, allow a buyer to upgrade his processor from i5 to i7 after
purchase to scale to her computing needs in exchange for a payment made to the manufac-
turer. During manufacture or in the field, chip features may be enabled or disabled. While
chip cost is fixed, the manufacturer can set the chip selling price according to the features
enabled and markets being addressed.
6.3.2 Motivation for Smart Contract-based Solution
This section presents how smart contracts address the technical challenges of trans-
parency, longevity, trust, and single point of failure that can be frequently encountered in a
centralized system based remote feature configurations like Figure 6.1.
Transparency with Public Logs In Figure 6.1, the vendor may obtain personal
information about a user (such as computation pattern, working behavior, or resource usage)
that could be sold to advertisers for better advertisement targeting. Users would have no
way to directly verify what exact information their device sent if communication to the
cloud service was encrypted. The use of smart contracts provides a public, auditable log of
communication.
Longevity through Decentralization A user’s device lifetime may outlast the ven-
dor in the example of Figure 6.1. In smart contracts, an application’s core state and logic
are fully distributed, which allows an application to continue to operate or be picked up by
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Figure 6.2: User’s device uses smart contracts in Ethereum to rent upgraded feature config-
urations.
a new vendor long after the original vendor has shut down. As smart contracts are a public
interface, anyone can directly interact with the smart contract using their applications with
the assurance that the application’s state will be available on the blockchain, rather than
being lost with the shutdown of a vendor.
Minimized Trust using Smart Contracts The need to trust vendors or third
parties with personal information like credit cards or bank accounts creates worthy targets
for attack, many of which have been notoriously exploited [165]. Instead, users can avoid
this risk by directly interacting with deterministic business logic defined in smart contracts.
Transactors can use smart contracts as reliable escrows for digital assets, creating a platform
that supports various applications.
Removing Single Point of Weakness A blockchain can provide an elegant solu-
tion to remove the single point of weakness in a centralized scenario. For example, in a
blockchain-based solution, the first requests for a configuration update will be served by
the manufacturer’s node. The manufacturer’s node also takes part in the network initially,
but after the configuration codes have propagated to enough nodes, it can stop serving. As
a result, a device that joins the network long after the manufacturer has stopped serving
can still retrieve the requested configuration update and be assured that it is the right file.
Contrary to this solution, in the centralized scenario in Figure 6.1, the device may poll the
manufacturer’s server for an update and get a 404 error [29].
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6.4 Proposed Protocol and Smart Contract Implementation
This section outlines the system design and smart contract implementation for our pro-
posed IC feature configuration protocol.
6.4.1 System Design
In our proposed protocol, users can upgrade IC features or rent upgraded IC features
for a fixed period after purchasing an IC. We propose implementing this repeated, remote,
and secure programming of the IC using a smart contract, as shown in Figure 6.3. The
owner of a device requests for remote configuration by sending the list of upgrade-able
functional components or IPs, and intended period of usage to the smart contract. The
smart contract first verifies the authenticity of the device ownership. According to the
requested configurable features, the smart contract sets the configuration state. The user
device periodically polls the state of the smart contract and receives the latest configuration
code.
Our proposed system design has two main components: (i) the smart contract that
defines the protocol for renting IC feature configurations and (ii) the on-die hardware module
that communicates with the smart contract and enforces its functionalities. In this section,
we provide the details of our smart contract implementation. In Section 6.5, we present the
details of the proposed hardware design.
6.4.2 Implementation of Smart Contracts
In our proposed protocol, a smart contract defines the condition for registering a new
device by a manufacturer, upgrading device configuration by a user and querying the current
configuration by the device. The smart contract is created by the manufacturer to maintain
uniform applicability and usability for all of the owners of all devices. In the following, we
describe all the steps in our protocol and how our proposed smart contract implements these
services.
6.4.2.1 Register Device
Any new device produced by the manufacturer must be registered first. This require-
ment is necessary because each device’s configuration code will be encrypted with device
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Figure 6.3: Proposed protocol for remote configuration of IC features using smart contracts.
Transactions requiring payment of fees are drawn with solid black lines.
public key. During usage, the user can request a specific configuration for a target device.
The manufacturer performs the registration by issuing a transaction registerDevice() to
the smart contract. Algorithm 6 presents the pseudo-code of function registerDevice().
This function enrolls a device with all necessary information, if the message sender is the
manufacturer. In our proposed protocol, each device is associated with the following three
pieces of information:
Device identifier This is a device identification data used to look up the targeted device
being queried among many devices. It can be a serial number of the device (e.g., Electronic
Product code, or EPC).
Device private key Each device has a unique private key and the corresponding public
key. The manufacturer uses this public key to encrypt all possible configurations during
the registration phase. The encryption is necessary to make sure that only the target
device can decrypt the configuration, and any other device of similar type cannot apply the
configuration. The device can later decrypt the encrypted configuration using its private
key and apply the configuration. The private-public key pair may be keys for RSA, DSA,
Elliptic Curve based public key cryptosystems, etc.
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ALGORITHM 6: Pseudo-code of registerDevice() for registering a device claimed by a
manufacturer.
Inputs: Device information (deviceInfo), a list of configurations encrypted with device public
key (K+d (config1), K
+
d (config2) etc.), pricing, and owner’s address (addrOwner)
if Message sender is the Manufacturer then
Set owner of deviceInfo as addrOwner
Set current configuration as K+d (configDefault)






All possible device configurations The manufacturer determines all possible con-
figurations in a device and encrypts those configuration codes using the device public key.
For example, if the configuration code is config1, the manufacturer uses the device public
key, K+d to encrypt the code and produce encrypted configuration, K
+
d (config1). Simi-
larly, the manufacturer encrypts and registers all the configurations, such as, K+d (config1),
K+d (config2) etc. These configurations can be the same for all devices of the same type.
6.4.2.2 Upgrade Configuration
The user issues a transaction upgradeConfiguration() to the smart contract to upgrade
the configuration of a device. This smart contract function defines the feature upgrade policy
that enforces its execution without an intermediary, so only authorized devices can request
and receive the update. The policy includes the manufacturer’s pre-defined Service Level
Agreement (SLA) with the customer. The required cost for getting a particular feature
upgrade can be set using various policies out of this work’s scope.
The smart contract function upgradeConfiguration() first verifies if the request sender
for the feature upgrade is the device’s owner. If this is true, the function then calculates the
required transaction fee for that requested feature upgrade. If the requester makes enough
payment with the transaction, the function sets the device configuration’s current state as
the requested configuration. The function also initiates the transfer of the upgrade fee from
the contract’s address to the manufacturer’s wallet address.
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ALGORITHM 7: Pseudo-code of upgradeConfiguration() for upgrading the configuration
of the device.
Input: Device identifier (deviceIdentifier), requested configuration (config), and usage
period
if (Message sender is the owner of deviceIdentifier) then
Calculate required price for feature upgrade
if Message value == required price then
Set current configuration state of deviceIdentifier as K+d (config)
Set current configuration period of deviceIdentifier as usage period








The device interacts with the blockchain network and polls the smart contract periodi-
cally by querying the function queryConfiguration(). This function returns the requested
configuration and the upgrade period to the requesting device. The devices either ship with
the smart contract’s address baked into their blockchain client, or they find it via a discovery
service [59]. The device interaction with blockchain and the smart contract can happen in
the following two ways.
The device itself runs a blockchain node The device needs a piece of software,
known as a client, to run a blockchain full node or a light node (retrieving data live). A client
is an implementation of a blockchain that verifies all transactions in each block, keeping the
network secure and the data accurate. In this case, the device directly receives the query
output from the smart contract in blockchain and then processes it. However, resource-
constrained devices do not possess enough horsepower to run a software client for intensive
blockchain calculations.
An edge gateway device runs a blockchain node We propose delegating the
task of running a blockchain node to gateways or any other unconstrained device capable
of providing this functionality. In this case, the gateway runs the blockchain client. It is
the entry point into the blockchain network (main-, test- or private net), capable of running
as a full node or a light node. It can be used by the user device as a gateway into the
Ethereum network via JSON RPC endpoints exposed on top of HTTP, WebSocket and/or
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IPC transports [11]. We propose the gateway solution to be more efficient as the device
does not require running a computation-intensive blockchain node. Besides, the gateway
can provide the blockchain service to all the devices in the same network. In the next
section, we describe how our proposed hardware module processes the configuration once
the device receives it.
6.5 Proposed Hardware-software Co-design for Remote Configuration
In our proposed protocol, the device polls the smart contract periodically, receives the
requested configuration from the blockchain, and then executes it. We partitioned this
execution framework into software and hardware design. In the following, we describe the
operations performed in these parts.
6.5.1 Software
The software code is executed on the device processor and handles control tasks such
as interaction with the blockchain and communication with the hardware part. This code
is flashed on the processor’s write-protected internal ROM during manufacturing and gets
executed during or after booting.
Interacting with Blockchain Node The device software interacts with a blockchain
node running on a gateway by sending a request through JSON RPC either over HTTP or
WebSocket; as a single request. The requests follow this format in Ethereum:
{“method” : “eth_call”, “id” : 1, “jsonrpc” : “2.0”, “params” : [{“to” : “..”, “data” : “..”]}
The method essentially defines what function an Ethereum node should execute. It either re-
quests data from the node, executes an EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) function, returns
a response, or transmits data to the Ethereum network (send a transaction). In our design,
we use the eth_call method to retrieve already mined data from the blockchain about a
particular smart contract. The id field is an identifier string set by the device and helps
make sure the device and the gateway are communicating in the same context. The jsonrpc
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field specifies the protocol version and must be exactly 2.0, which the protocol expects. The
to field is the smart contract address.
To query the device configuration using eth_call, we use the queryConfiguration()
function of the contract. The JSON-RPC format expects eth_call to have a specific data
field format. The data is the first four bytes of the Keccak-256 hash of the function’s signa-
ture. The signature is defined as the function name with the parenthesized list of parameter
types. The response returned for this request is a hexadecimal number concatenated from
two values (encrypted configuration code and the upgrade period), each padded to a 32-byte
length with zeroes.
Decrypting the Configuration Code After receiving an appropriate configuration
code and the upgrade period for that configuration, the device software first decrypts the
encrypted configuration code using the private key. We assume that the private key is hard-
coded in the software design for the implementation purpose. After that, the functional
component configuration process starts in our proposed on-die hardware module. As pro-
cessing the configuration is the core part of our remote device management system design,
we propose the implementation of this processing in hardware for enhanced security.
6.5.2 Hardware
The custom hardware part aims to secure and accelerate the configuration process. For
processing the configuration, we propose a Configuration Controller Module (CCM), as
shown in Figure 6.4. Our proposed hardware design consists of the following modules.
6.5.2.1 Hardware configuration module (HCM)
This module acts as the main controller module for the chip. The hardware configuration
module (HCM) receives the configuration code from the blockchain module and directs
changes to functional component characteristic settings. This module enables conditional
activation or deactivation of on-chip functions provided by the on-chip modules in response
to the reception of the external reconfiguration request. The chip subsequently utilizes the
activated chip features during operation. The HCM forwards the configuration code and the
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Figure 6.4: Proposed hardware design for remote configuration of IC features (FC: Func-
tional Component).
upgrade period to the encryption module in the crypto engine and the timestamp module,
respectively.
The HCM receives the encrypted configuration from the encryption module and stores
this updated configuration in an on-chip or off-chip programmable non-volatile storage
(EEPROM/flash). The module also sets a configuration flag while storing the new con-
figuration. The software code checks this flag bit during or after the next boot up and
configures the hardware accordingly. If the flag bit is on (logic-1 ), the software loads the
HCM with the updated configuration (after decrypting it with the decryption module). Oth-
erwise, the software loads the HCM with the default configuration the device is provisioned
with during manufacturing.
6.5.2.2 Timestamp module
The timestamp module receives the upgraded reconfiguration period from the HCM
and sets the timestamp counter with that value. After the upgrade period, the timestamp
module notifies the HCM. The HCM changes the device configuration settings to the default
after the upgrade period. The timestamp module also decrements the timestamp counter
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value with the usage period to keep track of the remaining upgrade period. The module
periodically sends the remaining upgrade period to the HCM. The HCM stores this value in
the storage along with the encrypted configuration. The software loads the HCM with the
upgraded configuration and the remaining upgrade period during or after the next boot up.
6.5.2.3 Crypto module
The crypto module performs symmetric encryption of the configuration file to prevent
any physical attacks from retrieving the configuration. Encrypting the configuration requires
the device to have a unique secret key. This module also manages the keys for symmetric key
cryptographic operations. We assume that the symmetric key is hard-coded in the design
for the implementation purpose. The symmetric key can be generated from a PUF-based
system for additional security, as described earlier in Section 2.5.3.2. We propose the use of
AES for symmetric encryption.
AES Encryption Module The symmetric key (AES key) encrypts the configuration
and stores the encrypted configuration in a persistent storage. For the symmetric encryption
algorithm, we choose AES-128 in counter (CTR) mode. AES-CTR mode’s advantage is that
it uses the only AES encrypt operation (for both encryption and decryption), making the
implementation smaller than many other AES modes. This design makes implementations
simpler and yields a significant throughput increase in hardware.
AES Decryption Module During device boot-up, the decryption module generates
the configuration using the AES key. In AES-CTR mode, this is the same module as the
encryption module. To decrypt something, the input states need to be successive values of
the same “counter” used for encryption. Then the binary sequence output is XOR-ed to the
ciphertext to get the plain text.
6.6 Implementation and Protocol Demonstration
In this section, we present the experimental setup, implementation of smart contract for
prototyping our proposed protocol, and evaluation of the experimental results.
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Table 6.1: Estimates of transaction fees for various operations.
Transaction Paying Party Gas Limit Gas Price (ETH) Cost (ETH) Cost (USD)
Contract Creation Manufacturer 367191 33 ×10−9 0.012127 4.25
registerDevice() Manufacturer 103642 40 ×10−9 0.004145 1.45
upgradeConfiguration() User 30184 30 ×10−9 0.0009055 0.32
6.6.1 Implementation of the Smart Contract
We implemented the proposed smart contract in Solidity programming language and
tested the functionalities in both Ropsten1 and Rinkeby2 Ethereum Test Networks. After
that, we deployed the smart contract in Main Ethereum Network3 and evaluated the protocol
in terms of its operational cost. We made the source code publicly accessible in Github
[20]. In particular, we estimated the cost of each operation by measuring the gas amount
(execution fee for the transaction made on Ethereum) for all of the functions involved in the
process, as shown in Table 6.1.
6.6.2 Implementation of Feature Configuration by Hardware
6.6.2.1 Target device and the Hardware Architecture
We implemented the feature configuration using our proposed hardware design. For
our experiments, we used the Xilinx Zynq-7000 System-on-Chip platform, which integrates
a dual-core ARM Cortex A9 processing system along with Xilinx Virtex-7 family pro-
grammable logic. The target device used is Zedboard Zynq Evaluation and development
kit (xc7z020clg484-1). The overall system contains the following components: Zynq Pro-
cessing System (PS), Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART), Timer and
our customized IP. The customized IP communicates with the processor via the memory-





Figure 6.5: Experimental setup for demonstrating feature configuration using proposed hard-
ware design. The Raspberry Pi works as the gateway.
6.6.2.2 Gateway
To interact with the blockchain and receive the smart contract state updates, the device
needs to connect to a blockchain client. We use a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ that acts as an
edge gateway device for running the blockchain client. The Raspberry Pi is equipped with
a 1.4GHz 64-bit Quad Core ARMv8 processor. Figure 6.5 shows the hardware setup for
our experiment. We run the most prominent blockchain client implementation, go-ethereum
or geth [11] on the Raspberry Pi. The Zedboard’s Processing System (PS) uses geth as a
gateway into the Ethereum network via JSON RPC endpoints exposed on top of HTTP.
To implement such a two-way end device-Ethereum proxy, gateway connects to WiFi to
communicate with both end-device and an Ethereum client to route data to the blockchain
network.
6.6.2.3 Protocol Demonstration
We show the proof-of-concept by enabling and disabling different hardware blocks with
the upgraded and the default configuration. In one exemplary implementation, we turn on
the board LEDs according to the configuration upgrade requested by the user. The Zed-
board communicates with the gateway via the Tx and Rx pins for Universal Asynchronous
Receiver/Transmitter (UART). An ESP8266-01 device connected to the Zedboard PMOD
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works as the WiFi station and is controlled by AT Commands through UART communica-
tion [9]. From the Zedboard, we initiate a TCP connection with the gateway and periodically
send an HTTP POST request to the gateway. This POST request contains the query to
the smart contract. Figure 6.6 shows the HTTP POST Content sent from the Zedboard via
ESP8266-01. The returned output from the query to the smart contract is then processed
by the hardware design in Zedboard FPGA.
Figure 6.6: HTTP POST Content sent from the Zedboard via ESP8266-01.
6.7 Results and Evaluation
We generated all results using Vivado Design Suite 2017.4. We functionally verified the
design using the Vivado simulator and performed the profiling and software implementation
in Xilinx SDK 2017.4. We described the design in Verilog at the Register Transfer Level
(RTL) for all the modules. We packaged all these Verilog source files for all the modules
into an IP. The Zynq Processing System (PS) accesses this IP as a memory-mapped IO
(Input/Output). For the timestamp module, we implemented a clock divider and counters
to keep track of the usage period and the remaining upgraded configuration period. To
access the Zedboard LEDs via the hardware configuration module, we set proper output pin
configurations in the design constraint file.
For the crypto module, we implemented the design blocks indicated by the rectangles
with sharp corners in Figure 6.4 (the encryption/decryption module). For the design blocks
indicated by the rectangles with rounded corners in Figure 6.4 , we initialized the design
with pre-defined keys — the symmetric key for the hardware part and the private key
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Table 6.2: Resource utilization of our hardware modules.
Module Slice LUTs Slice Registers Slice Frequency (MHz)
Crypto Module (AES) 2245 3602 1087 324.6
Timestamp Module 90 58 54 242.2
Remaining IP Block 482 602 205 242.2
Table 6.3: Device utilization summary.
Resource Utilization Available Utilization %
LUT 2844 53200 5.35
LUTRAM 60 17400 0.34
FF 4336 106400 4.07
IO 10 200 5.00
for the software part. We implemented the encryption module from Opencores4 using the
AES-128 encryption algorithm in the counter (CTR) mode operation with a pre-defined
“counter” value. In AES-CTR mode implementation, the AES hardware cost is reduced by
50% (decryption hardware is not required). This AES implementation features a pipeline
architecture with a fully synchronous and synthesize-able design. The design has only one
clock domain in entire core.
In our implementation, the maximum frequency calculated is 242.2MHz with a 100MHz
clock. In Table 6.2, we summarize the resource utilization (in LUTs and Slices) and max-
imum clock frequency of all building blocks. The maximum frequency of the AES from
Opencores is 324.6MHz with the throughput of 1.6Gbytes/second and latency of 21 clock
cycles. The device utilization summary is given in Table 6.3.
6.8 Security Analysis of the Protocol
This section considers various system-level and hardware-level threats in our proposed
protocol and how our proposed solution can counter them.
4https://opencores.org/projects/tiny_aes
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Overuse of reconfiguration After paying for the upgrade, the user might want to
enjoy the upgraded features in his device even after the upgrade period. Our Hardware
Configuration Module (HCM) ensures that the configuration is set back to the previous
state after the upgraded reconfiguration period.
Free loading If a user owns multiple devices of same type, he might rent just one
upgraded reconfiguration and apply the same upgraded reconfiguration to all of his devices.
In our protocol, each reconfiguration is encrypted using the public key (K+d ) of the device.
So, only that specific device can decrypt it with its private key (K−d ) and install the recon-
figuration. This private key is unique to each device and any other device cannot decrypt
the firmware and install it.
Arbitrary pricing In a centralized system, the vendor could charge arbitrary fees
from the users. In our proposed protocol, as pricing model is pre-determined in the smart
contract, the users are safeguarded from any arbitrary pricing.
Incorrect payment by the user The user might not send enough money to get
the reconfiguration upgrade. In our protocol, the payment is automated and follows the
pre-established rules of the smart contract. If the user pays less than the required amount
of money for the upgrade, he/she doesn’t get the upgrade.
Physical attack by a malicious user to steal the configuration file An attacker
might want to mount a physical attack on the device to get the configuration file and apply
the stolen configuration to other devices or the same device later. Our proposed HCM stores
the configurations encrypted to prevent any physical attacks by an attacker.
Integrity of the reconfiguration and sender authentication A malicious attacker
could modify the reconfiguration en route to the user’s device via a man-in-the-middle
attack or a compromised gateway. Our proposed protocol provides sender authentication
and reconfiguration integrity through digital signatures. During device registration, the
manufacturer computes the signature for a configuration c by RSA-encrypting c with the
manufacture’s private key K−m. The manufacturer then appends the signature K−m(c) to the
configuration c and registers the device with both information. Our scheme does not apply
a hash function on the configuration to create the digital signature, as the configuration size
would be smaller than the hash digest. Generally, when the hash digest is much smaller
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Figure 6.7: Authentication of the manufacturer, integrity and confidentiality of the config-
uration in our protocol.
than the original message’s size, the hash function is applied to reduce the computational
effort while creating the digital signature.
Before applying the update, the device receives both the configuration and the digi-
tal signature from the blockchain. The device then RSA-decrypts the signature using the
manufacturer’s public key K+m, yielding c′. If c and c′ match, two essential things can be en-
sured: (i) the manufacturer signed the configuration and (ii) the configuration had not been
changed in transit, so that message integrity is given. The manufacturer’s public key could
be fused at the fabric/hardware level. We note here that the configuration and the signature
are encrypted by the corresponding device public key K+d during the registration process
and later decrypted by the device private key K−d , as described in Section 6.4.2.1. Figure
6.7 presents the overall scheme for the manufacturer authentication and the configuration
integrity and confidentiality in our proposed protocol.
6.9 Limitations and Discussion
In this section, we identify the limitations and deployment considerations for our pro-
posed protocol. We comment on possible ways to overcome these issues and highlight the
ongoing works that are being done to address them.
6.9.1 Performance
Compared to a properly configured centralized database, a blockchain results in lower
transaction throughput and higher latencies. For example, Main Ethereum blockchain’s
average throughput is 15 transactions per second. In addition, since miners are incentivized
to prioritize transactions with higher rewards, the transaction time can be strongly affected
by the transaction’s gas price.
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Figure 6.8: Transaction times of upgradeConfiguration() for increasing gas price in the
Main Ethereum network with a gas limit of 83500.
In Figure 6.8, we issue transactions upgradeConfiguration() to our smart contract,
with varying gas prices while holding all other variables constant. We measure the time
it takes from sending the transaction from a node on the Ethereum Mainnet to seeing that
transaction executed and included in a block on the chain. We issued the transaction six
times with each gas price. As we can see from the Figure 6.8, a higher gas price reduces
both the mean transaction time and the variance of transaction times, down to an average
of 13 seconds with a gas price of 60× 10−9 Ether. However, if we increase the gas price
more, we observe diminishing returns as eventually we are bottlenecked by the Ethereum
network’s throughput.
In Figure 6.9, we use a constant gas price and gas limit and run the same transaction
10 times over two days. The network load and gas value differ with time, resulting in higher
tail latencies when a constant gas price is used. Our experiments measure a mean latency
of 112 seconds and a 95-percentile latency of 190 seconds.
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Figure 6.9: Cumulative density function (CDF) for the upgradeConfiguration() transac-
tion times in the Main Ethereum network with a gas price of 40× 10−9 Ether and a gas
limit of 83500.
The comparatively lower performance of Ethereum smart contracts implies that applica-
tions that use them must design around the possibility of transaction delays (on the order of
minutes to hours), or increase the gas price to reduce transaction times (down to the order
of tens of seconds). In our protocol, In our protocol, we design the sequence of events so that
transaction latency can be hidden from the user by allowing the Ethereum smart contract
transactions to occur before the user device receives the configuration code (Figure 6.3).
Few newer proposals, such as sharding [140], Bitcoin-NG [77], Stellar [152], show promising
results to address performance.
6.9.2 Vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts
In contrary to traditional software, smart contracts cannot be directly patched after
deployment. If a smart contract contains critical bugs, such as logical errors and lacks a
self-destruct, assets can get locked in the contract. Smart contracts may have vulnerabil-
ities at the programming language, bytecode, and blockchain levels that expose them to
various kinds of attacks [35, 46]. The most notable example of bugs was in the Distributed
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Autonomous Organization (The DAO) smart contracts that allowed a hacker to steal over
$50M USD worth of Ethers out of the $168M funds invested. The Ethereum community
voted to return (or hard fork) the state of the network to one prior to the hack, recovering
Ethers back to investors. These challenges impose a unique set of considerations for design-
ing smart contracts. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature to increase smart
contracts’ security [46,63]. There are two common strategies to update smart contracts: (i)
using a self-destruct function to release the contract’s internal states, sending all the funds
to a particular address, and then publishing a new contract, or (ii) including a mutable
reference to the address of a newly created contract after the old contract is deprecated.
6.9.3 Transactional Privacy
Blockchain transactions contain a source address, a destination address, and the data
or assets to be transferred. For validation, the content of every transaction is exposed to
every node on the network. Although the addresses are not explicitly tied to any real-world
identity, an interested party can monitor and analyze the data to discover patterns about
a user’s transactions. Several literature works have proposed techniques to attain transac-
tional privacy, such as zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge
(zkSNARK) [189], homomorphic commitments [150]. Other works, such as Hawk [127], ex-
plore methods for creating privacy-preserving smart contracts that do not store transactions
clearly to maintain transactional privacy from the public.
6.10 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we proposed a smart contract-based device management system that can
facilitate the configuration of functional components included in a remotely located IC. This
system allows individual ICs to be custom configured to a specification mutually agreed by
manufacturer and buyer. We partitioned the framework into software and hardware parts
based on the analysis result of a pure software solution and the hardware overhead under
design constraints. Our small hardware footprint ensures that the configuration code runs
securely and that the encryption key is not leaked. Without hardware support, it cannot be




In this dissertation, we propose an integrated platform solution for IoT device authen-
tication, privacy, and security via blockchain-based smart contracts. We believe blockchain
for IoT has the potential to enable a decentralized trust model for interoperable, digitized
identities of devices and transactions between them on a global scale.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
For our first contribution, we ensure IoT device authentication by blockchain-based IC
traceability system, from the time of its fabrication to its end-of-life, which allows both
the supplier and a potential customer to verify an IC’s provenance. To corroborate the
blockchain information, we authenticate the IC securely and uniquely by embedded Physi-
cally Unclonable Function (PUF).
Secondly, the blockchain also integrates the protection of privacy of data generated from
the IoT devices by giving users control of their own privacy. We tailor the hardware to meet
the blockchain performance. We propose a side-channel attack to to extract the private key
successfully by exploiting the users’ reliance on third-party hosted nodes to access the wallet,
initiate transactions, and more. We propose a method where a co-tenant thread monitors the
power management side-channel information from a thread affected by a hardware Trojan.
Such a Trojan can leak private keys and disrupt digital transactions.
To conclude this dissertation research, we also propose a secure, remote configuration of
IC features using smart contracts. In contrast to conventional enabling/disabling techniques
rigidly carried out solely by the manufacturer, our proposed protocol provides flexible tech-
niques by which a user may selectively enable/disable hardware features. The blockchain
framework facilitates decentralized IoT where interacting devices are empowered to au-
tonomously execute digital contracts.
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7.2 Future Works
Our proposed dissertation research provides many new dimensions that are worth ex-
ploring in future work.
Secure data transmission from the device to the blockchain We have looked
into requesting data from the blockchain node. In the future, we can look into the secure
data transmission from the IoT device to the blockchain node. Our custom hardware design
can be utilized for enabling secure data transmission from the device to the blockchain.
Dynamic pricing for remote IC Features configuration Leveraging our custom
hardware, this secure data transmission can unearth several new applications. With time,
when the device’s performance will degrade due to aging, the manufacturer may lower its
price accordingly, till its expiry. According to the age of the devices, we can develop a
mechanism that can facilitate automated dynamic pricing of a device based on prior protocols
defined in the smart contracts. If the device has a Residual Life Meter (RLM) [102,104], it
can send its aging data to the blockchain. We can adopt a dynamic pricing scheme instead
of fixed pricing for the remote IC features configuration protocol using this aging data.
Customizing feature downgrades for a refund to the customer We can utilize
our proposed remote configuration protocol to allow a customer to disable unwanted fea-
tures selectively and subsequently apply for a refund corresponding to the disabled feature.
This technique can be value-added for a customer because it can allow flexible changes to
inventory (for a distributor) or individual products (for an end-user) to account for market
shifts or changes in personal preferences. This technique can also be value-added for the
manufacturer because the refund request may give the manufacturer some real-time data
regarding customer preferences and market conditions efficiently.
Leveraging AI to create Decentralized Autonomous Organizations We can
leverage the Big Data and Machine Learning aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI) along
with blockchain and other technologies. If AI is added to the IoT ecosystem connected to
a blockchain network, it creates a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). DAO
refers to an organization that runs without any human intervention.
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APPENDIX A
MULTI-HOST HYPERLEDGER FABRIC IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the multi-host setup for Hyperledger Fabric implementation
[10]. It is a setup of a Raft-based ordering service using Docker Swarm as the multi-host
container environment. This setup is a more realistic deployment. We started everything
from scratch and performed the following steps to bring up this Fabric network in a four-host
deployment in the Google Cloud Platform (GCP) environment.
Our sample network comprises three peer organizations (representing the manufacturer,
distributor, and retailer) and one orderer organization, as shown in the above diagram.
We have a raft-based ordering service cluster of three ordering service nodes (orderers) in
the orderer organization. In each peer organization (Organization 1, Organization 2, and
Organization 3), there are two peers, Peer 0 and Peer 1. All peers have the CouchDB
database, and for all the peer organizations, Peer 0 works as the endorsing peer. Each
organization has their own certificate authority instance. The respective certificate authority
creates the certificates for all the participants (admin, peer, client) in an organization.
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We create a channel (consortium) mychannel among the three peer organizations. We
deploy the chaincode (smart contract) in this channel, and using the chaincode, we invoke
and query transactions. We deploy all the components and services (docker containers)
related to Organization 1, 2, and 3 in VM1 (virtual machine 1), VM2, and VM3, respectively.
For VM1 (Organization 1), we have a dedicated containerized API server to interact with
the Hyperledger Fabric network from outside the Docker Swarm Network (e.g., using our
local machine directly from the Postman client). Finally, we deploy all the components and
services related to the Orderer organization in VM4.
A.1 Bringing Up All Hosts
We bring up four GCP VM instances representing four hosts (four organizations) and
preload the required components (proper fabric prerequisite, tools, images) in the nodes
according to the Fabric documentation. The four hosts are running Fabric v2.0 on Ubuntu
18.04 LTS. We create a custom firewall opening all ports and allowing all traffic (all UDP,
TCP, and ICMP) for the demonstration purpose.
A.2 Forming an Overlay Network with Docker Swarm
We use Docker Swarm to form an overlay network and make all the four hosts join.
Docker Swarm is a container orchestration tool that provides an overlay network for con-
tainers across multiple hosts. Those containers on this overlay network can interact with
each other as if they were on a large host. We opened four terminals, one for each host.
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From Host 1,
Using the token from Host 1, we add other hosts as managers to this swarm. From Host 2,
3, and 4,
Finally, we add an overlay artifacts_test, which will be the network for our demo. We
create this overlay network on Host 1 only. If Docker Swarm works correctly, all nodes will
have this overlay network.
A.3 Preparing Fabric Network Materials in Host 1 and Copying to Others
One of the critical steps is to make sure that all components are sharing the same crypto
materials. For the sake of simplicity, in this demo, we create all the materials in Host 1
and then copy the whole directory to other hosts. We create a Certificate Authority (CA)
container for each organization. Certificates and signing keys for an organization (e.g.,
org1) are issued and signed by the same CA (ca.org1). For Organization 1, we create the
Certificate Authority container (ca.org1.example.com) on Host 1.
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In the following, we generate the required crypto materials for Organization 1 on Host 1.
After that, we register and enroll two peers, the admin and user.
Similarly, we create the Certificate Authority containers and generate the required crypto
materials for Organization 2 and Organization 3 on Host 1. After that, we register and
enroll the organizations’ peers, the admins and users. Finally, we create the Certificate
Authority container for Orderer Organization and generate the required crypto materials
on Host 1. This time, we register the three orderers. This way we create all the crypto
materials required for the Fabric network on Host 1.
In this way, we create the required crypto materials for all the participants for each organiza-
tion. With all these crypto materials available now, we run the create-artifacts.sh script
to create the Genesis block (genesis.block), the Channel transaction (mychannel.tx) file,
118
and the anchor peer update transaction files for the three peer organizations. We require
the Genesis block for bootstrapping the orderers and Channel transaction file for configuring
a channel among the peer organizations.
We have everything on Host 1 now. We copy this directory to all the other hosts. As we
cannot copy files across VMs, we first push this directory into a Git repository and pull that
repository to the other three VMs. After doing that, all nodes will have the same crypto
material and required docker-compose files. We are ready to bring up all containers.
A.4 Bringing Up the Containers in Each Host
We use docker-compose to bring up all containers in each host. In Host 1, there is a total
of five containers (two peers, two couchDBs for those two peers, a CLI container). We can
see the docker containers up and running on Host 1.
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Similarly, we use docker-compose to bring up all containers in Host 2, Host 3, and Host 4.
In Host 2 and 3 each, there is a total of four containers (two peers, two couchDBs for those
two peers). In Host 4, there is a total of three containers (three orderers). The terminal
outputs on Host 2 and Host 4 are shown below.
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A.5 Creating Channel and All Peer Nodes Joining It
As we have CLI only on Host 1, we issue all commands from the Host 1 terminal.
We first create the channel configuration block for mychannel and make the two peers of
Organization 1 join the channel using this block.
From the Host 2 and Host 3, we fetch the channel configuration block and make their peers
join the channel using this block. The terminal output from Host 2 is shown below.
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A.6 Installing and Instantiating TraceIC Chaincode
In this step, we package, install, and approve the traceic chaincode for Organization 1
on Host 1. After chaincode approval from Organization 1, we check the commit readiness
of the chaincode. As the other two peer organizations have not approved the chaincode yet,
we can see only approval from Organization 1 for the chaincode.
We choose the chaincode life-cycle endorsement policy as N of N. So, we have to package,
install and approve the chaincode for Organization 2 from Host 2 and Organization 3 from
Host 3.
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After the Organization 2 and Organization 3 approve the chaincode, we can commit chain-
code definition to all the endorsing peers. We can do it from any host. The following shows
committing the chaincode by Organization 1 from the CLI container on Host 1.
As the CLI container is in the Docker Swarm network, the chaincode container gets created
in each host. Thus each organization now has the chaincode container on their respective
VM. We can also verify if the chaincode commit is successful by querying it.
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A.7 Invoking and Querying the Chaincode
After we commit the chaincode and create the container for it, the next step is to invoke
and query the chaincode. First, we invoke init and then invoke createIC with some sample
arguments to the chaincode from the CLI container.
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We can verify the invokation from Fauxton. Fauxton is a native web-based interface built into
CouchDB. It provides a basic interface to most functionalities, including creating, updating,
deleting, viewing documents, and designing documents.
After that, we can query an IC record from the CLI container. This query result shows that
the fabric network is working well.
Invoking or querying the chaincode from the CLI container is a little cumbersome process.
We create a separate API service container (artifacts_api_1 ) to interact with the chaincode
from outside the virtual machine using Postman client. For implementing the API, we use
the latest Fabric SDK. This implementation contains a Nodejs API and uses JWT (JSON
Web Token) for user identity verification.
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We implement three APIs in the container: (i) register user, (ii) register IC, and (iii) query
IC. Firstly, we register a new user, and then with the new user token, we invoke and query
the chaincode. As we register and enroll new users for an organization at runtime, we have to
ensure that the CA container is up and running for that organization. For the demonstration
purpose, we create the API container on Host 1 and use its IP address and port number to
register a new user from the Postman client.
We see that the user gets a token. The token gets mapped to an ID, and all crypto materials
and the identification (ID) for that user get created inside the container on Host 1.
Using the token created during the registration, the user can issue transactions to the chain-
code. First, we invoke createIC transaction with some sample arguments (key, identifier,
type, CRP, and owner) to the traceic chaincode in channel mychannel.
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We see that the IC is successfully registered. We can also verify the invokation from the
CouchDB database in peer 0 of Organization 1 update from the Fauxton as shown below.
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The CouchDB databases in other organizations’ peers also get updated with a successful
transaction invokation. The CouchDB database for peer 0 of Organization 2 is shown as
below.
After we invoke the chaincode, we use query to check again.
In this demonstration, we implement a RAFT-based orderer cluster with a Fabric net-
work. These containers run on four different hosts. Docker Swarm brings these four hosts
together, allowing containers running on separate hosts to communicate. We do not specify
static IP on fabric network components, and all containers communicate with each other
such that they were on the same host. We use the existing Docker Compose files with
minimum modification to run on Docker Swarm.
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE CODE SNIPPET FOR TRIGGERING THE PMU-TROJAN
Table B.1: Code Snippet for Triggering the PMU-Trojan
echo -n "userspace" > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_governor
echo -n 3100 /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_setspeed
openssl speed
echo -n 2700 /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_setspeed
openssl speed
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